The validity of a minor's conversion to Islam must adhere to applicable laws at the time, and jurisdiction over religious status cases lies with the Syariah Courts unless proven otherwise.

Abu Bakar Jais FCJ (Majority):

Introduction

[1] Although the dispute in this case concerns the status of a party, it is also related to the larger sphere where different jurisprudence and jurisdictions of the Syariah Courts and the Civil Courts have come to the fore. Though the Syariah Courts and the Civil Courts are well recognised by our own Federal Constitution, the existence of both at the same time in the administration of justice in this country is not without difficulties.

[2] We heard two related appeals against the majority decision of the Court of Appeal in this case. This Court had earlier allowed leave to appeal against that majority decision based on the questions of law proposed as follows:

(1) Is the date of the conversion of a person into Islam the date of his or her actual conversion or the date of issuance of a card confirming the fact of conversion?

(2) In determining the legality of the conversion of a minor into Islam, is the legality of such conversion to be tested against the applicable law as it stood at the time of when the conversion occurred? Further to this:

(a) Can the said minor be deemed to be Muslim notwithstanding by virtue of provisions akin to the definition of "Muslim" in s 2 of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003?

(b) Is such definition only applicable to the children of persons born into the religion of Islam such that, where the children of persons who converted into Islam after the birth of such children are concerned, such children must convert into Islam for them to be treated in law as such?

(3) In any event, does s 74(3) of the Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1989 (Selangor) oust the jurisdiction of the High Court to determine the validity of a minor's conversion into Islam?

(4) Where an order of the Syariah Court is a nullity, can such order be collaterally attacked in proceedings before the High Court pursuant to the rule enunciated by the Federal Court in Eu Finance Berhad v. Lim Yoke Foo, [1982] 2 MLJ 37 and does art 121(1A) of the Federal Constitution apply?

(5) Whether the Civil Courts have the powers to reverse findings of facts made by the Syariah Court in the determination of matters of Islamic law and doctrine?

(6) Is Rosliza Ibrahim v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor, [2021] 2 MLJ 181 limited to have only prospective overruling, based on the principles as enunciated in:

(a) Letchumanan Chettiar Alagappan @ L Allagappan & Anor v. Secure Plantation Sdn Bhd, [2017] 4 MLJ 697; and

(b) The decision of the House of Lords in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd; National Westminster Bank PLC v. Spectrum Plus Ltd And Others [2005] 4 All ER 209.

[3] Having heard the appeal, we had reserved our decision. I would now explain the reasons of my decision having considered both the oral and written submissions of all parties.

Background Facts

[4] Before us, the parties for the first appeal were Dahlia Dhaima Binti Abdullah as the appellant and Majlis Agama Islam Selangor as the respondent. She was also the appellant for the second appeal, while Kerajaan Negeri Selangor was the respondent.

[5] The appeals before us emanated from an originating summons ("OS") filed in 2021 by the appellant at the High Court ("HC") against the respondents. In the OS, the appellant sought a declaration that she is not a person professing the religion of Islam. Although both the respondents opposed the OS, the HC granted the declaration. The respondents then lodged the appeals against the decision of the HC to the Court of Appeal ("COA"). By a majority, the COA set aside that decision of the HC and allowed the appeals. Hence, the present appeals by the appellant before us.

[6] The appellant was born on 17 November 1986 to a non-Muslim married couple. Her late father was of Indian descent and professed the religion of Hinduism. Her mother is of Chinese descent and was born to a Buddhist family. The appellant's parents' marriage was solemnized under the Law Reform (Marriage and Div