Lord Cohen:

The appellant is an advocate and solicitor practising in the Federation of Malaya. He appeals against an Order of the Supreme Court of the Federation dated the 27th August, 1953, suspending him from practice for a period of six months in respect of each of two charges brought against him but directing that in each case the period of suspension was to commence from the date of the Order.

The Judgment of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was delivered by:-

The Order was made under s. 26 of the Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance, 1947 (No. 4 of 1947) It is, so far as material in the following terms:

Section 26 - (1) Every advocate and solicitor shall be subject to the control of the Court and shall be liable on due cause shown to have his admission revoked and to be struck off the roll of the Court or to be suspended from practice for any period not exceeding two years or to be ensured. (2) Such due cause may be shown by proof that such advocate and solicitor -

(b) has been guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty ...

The question at issue is as to the meaning to be placed on the words "grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty". It is unnecessary to set out in full the other provisions of the Ordinance. Suffice it to say that under s. 27 any complaint of the conduct of an advocate and solicitor in his professional capacity must be made in the first place to the appropriate Local Bar Committee who, if they consider that a full investigation of the complaint is necessary, have to apply in writing to the Chief justice to appoint a Disciplinary Committee to bear and investigate the complaint.

Under s. 29 the Disciplinary Committee have to record their findings as to the facts of the case and their opinion as to the conduct of the advocate and solicitor and as to whether the facts of the case constitute due cause for disciplinary action under s. 26. They draw up their findings in the form of a report, a copy of which is forwarded to the Chief Justice and to the Bar Council. The advocate and solicitor concerned and the person who made the complaint is entitled to a copy of the report on application.

By s. 31 it is provided that an application for an Order under s. 26 should be made by originating motion ex parte for an Order calling upon the advocate and solicitor to show cause why an Order should not be made under the section. The order is served on the practitioner concerned and the application is then heard by a Court of three Judges of whom the Chief Justice must be one. From the decision of that Court there is no appeal to any Court in the Malayan Union but it is provided that for the purposes of an appeal to this Board an Order made under the subsection is to be deemed an Order of the Court of Appeal.

The complaint in the present case arose out of the affairs of the Foh Hup Omnibus Co., a company incorporated under the Malayan Companies Ordinance, 1940 (No 49 of 1940). On the 2 June, 1932, there were held the Annual General Meeting and an Extraordinary General Meeting of the company at which a number of shareholders expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of its affair.

Between second June and tenth June three undated documents in identical terms were prepared calling for an Extraordinary General Meeting of the company to enable the signatories of the documents "to protest against the unconstitutional manner in which the General Meeting on second June was held and to pass a vote of no confidence on the sectaries, M/s. Lim Tam Chong & Co., and the directors holding office at present and hold a General Meeting constitutionally for election of office bearers." The three documents were signed by 24, 29 and 37 shareholders respectively. A copy of the three documents was produced before the Disciplinary Committee, the original not being available, and is referred to in its report as exh. A.

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