The Court of Appeal emphasized the necessity for inter partes hearings in injunction applications unless urgent circumstances exist, allowing for an interim injunction to prevent prejudice pending appeal.

Wong Kian Kheong JCA:

A. Introduction

[1] I have been directed by the learned President of the Court of Appeal (PCA) to sit alone pursuant to s 44(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA) and hear an ex parte Notice of Motion for an Erinford injunction pending the disposal of an appeal to the Court of Appeal.?

B. Background

[2] The appellant company (Appellant) entered into a "Carpark Operator Cum Licence Agreement' dated 1 October 2019 (Agreement), with Bukit Damansara Development Sdn Bhd (BDD). According to the Agreement, among others, BDD granted the Appellant a license to operate car park services, including valet services (Car Park Services), at VSquare @ PJ City Centre, Jalan Utara, 46200 Petaling Jaya, Selangor (Building). The Agreement was for a period of five years, commencing on 1 October 2019 and concluding on the 30 September 2024 (Expiry Date).

[3] Around December 2020, the second respondent (2nd Respondent) entered into a separate arrangement with BDD wherein the 2nd Respondent acquired ownership of the Building from BDD for a consideration of RM147 million.

[4] By a "Notice of Assignment' dated 2 November 2021 from BDD to the Appellant (copied to the 2nd Respondent), BDD informed the Appellant that, among others, BDD had assigned, novated and transferred absolutely all of BDD's rights, interest, benefits, liabilities and obligations under the Agreement to the 2nd Respondent.

[5] The first respondent company (1st Respondent) is a subsidiary of TH Properties Sdn Bhd (which is part of the 2nd Respondent's group of companies).

[6] The Appellant alleged as follows, among others:

(1) on 19 April 2024, the Appellant submitted a revised proposal to the 1st Respondent for an extension of the Agreement for an additional three-year term commencing from 1 October 2024 until 30 September 2027 (Appellant's Revised Proposal); and

(2) on 26 April 2024, the 2nd Respondent had accepted the Appellant's Revised Proposal. Hence, there was a valid extension of the Agreement from 1 October 2024 until 30 September 2027

[Alleged Extension (Agreement)].

[7] By a letter dated 28 August 2024 (issued under the cover of an email dated 2 September 2024), the 2nd Respondent notified the Appellant that the Agreement would expire on 30 September 2024 and gave the Plaintiff a two months' period (until 31 October 2024) for the smooth handover of the Car Park Services to the new car park operator [2nd Respondent's Notice (28 August 2024)]. The 2nd Respondent's Notice (28 August 2024) was copied to the 1st Respondent.

[8] According to the Appellant-

(1) the Appellant had relied on the expectation of the Alleged Extension (Agreement) and had therefore incurred expenditure in a sum of RM690,000.00; and

(2) due to the 2nd Respondent's Notice (28 August 2024), the Appellant now face a potential loss of profit as the Agreement would not be extended.

[9] The Appellant had recently discovered that the 2nd Respondent intended to award the operation of the Car Park Services to NES Solutions Sdn Bhd (NESS).

[10] A director and shareholder of NESS is Mr Eugene Berchman Netto (Mr Eugene), a former employee of the Appellant. With regard to Mr Eugene, the Appellant averred as follows:

(1) there were serious concerns regarding Mr Eugene's possession of proprietary and confidential information about the operational and contractual aspects of the Agreement;

(2) Mr Eugene had been entrusted by the Appellant to manage and handle the Appellant's account, including the Car Park Services; and

(3) when NESS was incorporated on 24 February 2020, Mr Eugene was still employed by the Appellant.

[11] The Appellant's solicitors sent a letter dated 18 October 2024 to the 1st Respondent [Appellant's Demand (18 October 2024)] which-

(1) demanded the 1st Respondent to honour the Alleged Extension (Agreement); and

(2) gave the 1st Respondent seven days to respond in writing to the Appellant's Demand (18 October 2024).

[12] There was no response by the 1st Respondent to the Appellant's Demand (