1949 MarsdenLR 130
HIGH COURT, SINGAPORE
TAN CHEE KONG – Appellant
Versus
LEE EE LIAT – Respondent
[Civil Suit No 116 Of 1949]
Taylor J:
In this action for libel the plaintiff is a clerk and the defendant a medical practitioner.The plaintiff received a letter addressed to himself at his home address and on the envelope the words "Ex-Informer - Kempeitai" were inserted between his name and the address.The letter was delivered in the ordinary course of the post to his house.The name was correctly spelt and the address is correctly given.The contents of the letter are not strictly relevant; it is sufficient to say it did not contain anything mitigating the libel carried on the cover.In my opinion, the words are a short way of saying that during the enemy occupation this man was an "informer" for the Kempeitai.
It is perfectly true that it was possible to work for the Japanese in various capacities without incurring odium.If it were said that Mr. So-and-So worked for the Japanese or that So-and-So consented to serve in the Police under them I do not think that anyone would say that such an allegation was defamatory.
The Kempeitai was a quite separate function and furthermore the position of an "informer" is one which must voluntary in almost every case. A man may be told by an Occupying Power that he should continue in the same position as before the war.He would be under two pressures, at least - one of public duty and economic pressure to feed his family.But if a man does not want to be an "informer" he is useless.He can say "I am very sorry I cannot get any information". The peculiar nature of the work of the Kempeitai cannot be done otherwise than voluntarily. I am therefore clearly of the opinion that the words are defamatory and hold the man up to hatred and contempt.Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the people who actually worked for the Kempeitai were hated at the time and are despised now. I think it is a generally true proposition.
There seems to have been some ill-feeling between the parties over the use by the Japanese of the defendant's motor car.There is little direct evidence about this but I think the appropriation of the car must be attributable to the Japanese officer rather than to the plaintiff who was only a local subordinate of a Japanese trading concern.
There is evidence that the plaintiff had some association with members of the Kempeitai and occasionally called at their office but there is not a scintilla of evidence that he was ever an informer, which is the real sting of the libel.The plaintiff may have been compelled to make these calls in relation to his employment by the Japanese firm.The defendant should have appreciated this for he himself was friendly with a Kempeitai officer whom he sometimes received in his private house.
A point has been made that inasmuch as Postal employees are sworn no secrecy there was no publication of the defamatory matter.This is misconception, the rule of official secrecy might well prevent a postal worker from further publishing of the libel by repeating it outside his office and it might also prevent the communication of the libel by one postal worker to another in the course of duty from amounting to republication by the former but that does not affect the fact that the action of the defendant necessarily involved publication of the libel to each person concerned as it came to him.The argument is, however, of some assistance to the plaintiff.Though there was publication it was limited in extent and the matter is much less serious than publication in a newspaper or in any other form which would ordinarily reach a large number of people on whom no obligation of secrecy rested.This materially reduces the damages.
On the case as a whole I was clearly of opinion that the defendant had published a seriously defamatory libel on the plaintiff but that the publication was very limited in its scope. I assessed the damages at $300.
Judgment for the Plaintiff with Costs.