Neal J (delivering oral judgment):

The Government of the Federation of Malaya appeals from an award of the arbitrator under the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, 1952, when a ruling was given that the failure to deny the claim constituted an admission under reg. 32, and although it is not clear from the record judgment was entered against the Federation Government for the compensation claimed.

A number of grounds of appeal were put forward on behalf of the Government of the Federation: only two of those I find to be of any substance, namely, whether or not reg. 32 of the Workmen's Compensation Reg, 1953 is intra vires or ultra vires the rule making power contained in the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance; and, secondly, whether even if the regulation be intra vires the powers of the rule making body that it creates no more than a rebuttable presumption, and the arbitrator was wrong in not so ruling and calling upon the Government to produce evidence in rebuttal, that is to say, the arbitrator was wrong in law in not giving an opportunity to the Government to produce evidence in rebuttal of the admission deemed to have been made. The first submission involves a decision on two points of law: firstly, and that has been so expressly raised on behalf of the workman, the regulation having been tabled before Parliament (as it then existed), and there being no motion to annul, whether there could be any enquiry in this Court as to whether or not reg. 32 in intra vires or ultra vires. The second question is, is reg. 32 intra vires or ultra vires the rule making power contained under the section of the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, 1952.

For the workman reliance was placed upon two authorities both of them before the decision of the House of Lords in Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood [1894] AC 347. It is not clear from the report of the latter one of them but it is clear from the report of the earlier case on which the second case was decided that there was express provision in the ordinance or in the legislation in that case that the rules if not objected to after tabling shall have effect as if enacted in the enactment. In view of the subsequent decision in Lockwood's case and the further decision of the House of Lords in Minister of Health v. The King (on the prosecution of Yaffe), [1931] AC 494. I find it unnecessary to deal in detail with those two authorities. In Lockwood's case the House of Lords were dealing as it is clear from Lord Dunedin's judgment in Yaffe's case with rules made under the rule making authority which provided for the tabling in Parliament and their becoming, if not objected to, part of the enactment. Such is not the case before me. s. 43(3) contains no such provision that the rules if not objected to shall form part of the Ordinance. The correctness of the decision in Lockwood's case has been challenged by the subsequent decision of the House of Lords in Yaffe's case. For myself, I am of the opinion that the authorities to the effect that this Court will not interfere with statutes and certain statutory instruments is limited to the statutes themselves and to such subsidiary legislation or instruments as are by the enactment itself declared to form part of the legislation enacted. I am not prepared nor do I know of any authorities to justify my extending the operation of those authorities to a case such as the present. As I appreciate the reasoning behind the authorities it is that this Court will exercise a jurisdiction to protect the public but will not exercise that jurisdiction where it has already been or could have been the subject of investigation or enquiry in the legislature. In this case I see no reason for denying myself jurisdiction or denying this Court jurisdiction. The legislature itself has not seen fit by the use of the usual language to claim freedom from the controls of this Court for these particular regulations. For these reasons, in my opinion, I have power to declare