Wilson J:

This is a Chambers Summons which was adjourned into Court for the purpose of convenience.The plaintiff is suing Lee Yat Kai and the Senior Inspector of Mines, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Malacca and the Inspector of Mines, Kuala Lumpur.Federal Counsel entered an appearance in the action on behalf of the two government officials.The plaintiff now asks that the appearance entered on behalf of the second and third defendants should be struck out.

Sir Roland Braddell has argued that, although Federal Counsel have a right of audience before the Courts, he is not an advocate and solicitor and therefore, had no right to enter an appearance on behalf of the two defendants.The rights of a Federal Counsel are set out in s. 55(2) of the Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance, 1947, as amended, and reads as follows

55(2) Nothing herein shall affect the right (which is hereby declared) of the Attorney General and of any person appointed to be Attorney General, Solicitor- General or a Federal Counsel to appear and plead and to do all other things necessary in respect of litigation or proceedings in any Court in the Malayan Union in respect of any matter in which he or Deputy Public Prosecutor is so instructed

to do by or on behalf of Government; and the Attorney General or the Solicitor-General shall have such priority is customary in England in the case of the Attorney General and of the Solicitor-General respectively.

It has been argued that that sub-section does not stand alone and that a number of other Ordinances and the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948 must be taken into consideration in construing the sub-section.The following cases have been cited in support of this contention:

Canada Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. The Queen [1898] AC 735 at p. 741.In that case Lord Davey stated : "Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and the other clauses of the Act.

Vacuumm Oil Co. v. Secretary of State, AIR 1932 PC 168.In that case it was held that "the Court should not deal separately with the terms of an enactment which is in its nature composite.

Barker v. Edgar & Ors. [1898] AC 748 Lord Hobhouse stated, at p. 754:

The general maxim is, Generalia specialibus non derogant.When the Legislature has given its attention to a separate subject, and made provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention very clearly.

Corporation of Blackpool v. Starr Estate Co., [1922] 1 AC 27 Viscount Haldane stated, at p. 34:

We are bound to apply a rule of construction which has been repeatedly laid down and is firmly established.It is that whenever Parliament in an earlier statute has directed its attention to an individual case and has made provision for it unambiguously, there arises a presumption that if in a subsequent statute the Legislature lays down a general principle, that general principle is not to be taken as meant to rip up what the Legislature had before provided for individually, unless an intention to do so is specially declared.

The Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hamilton, Fraser & Co. [1887] 12 AC 484.There, it was held that where the same words have for many years received a judicial construction it is not unreasonable to suppose that parties have contracted upon the belief that their words will be understood in what Lord Halsbury called "the accepted sense.

A passage was also quoted from Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., p. 20 in which it is stated that "if the general and specific enactments prove to be in any way repugnant to on another, the question will arise, which is to control the other?"

I cannot see that any of these authorities affect the proper construction of s. 55 (2) of Ordinance No. 4 of 1947.From the wording of this sub-section it would appear probable that some doubt was felt as to what were the privileges of the members of the Legal Department