Wilson J:

In this case the applicant is an executrix and trustee of her deceased husband Ng Kim Kang.By his will the deceased appointed the application his son Ng Jooi Thong, and Ch'ng Ean Jin his business partner, " trustees, and he also appointed another son Ng Jooi Meng to be in additional trustee when he attained the age of twenty-one, Chinese reckoning.These three persons are the respondents.The applicant asks for maintenance out of the estate at the rate of $1,500 a month and arrears of maintenance at the same rate.In his will, the & ceased appointed his wife as principal trustee.That is an expression which is unknown to me and I have no idea what he meant.If he had intended that the other trustees should have no say in the administration of the estate, he would not have appointed them as trustees at all.However, he has in certain clauses of his will given the applicant sole discretion.For the purposes of this case it to me that the only clause with which I am concerned is cl 9 which reads as follows:

I direct that the maintenance of my wife and family, the marriage, educational and other expenses of my children shall paid out of my estate at, the sole discretion of my wife the said Tan Jooi Khim.

It is to be observed that in cl 6 of the will he says:

I direct that before my son Ng Jooi Meng is added to the total number of my Trustees . . . . the management of my estate shall be carried out by all my three Trustees jointly.

It has been argued that under the will the applicant has got a life interest in the estate liable to be divested on distribution.Under cl 5 of the will, the testator devised all his properties unto his trustees, subject to payment of debt upon trust to be distributed amongst the beneficiaries at the latest when his youngest son attained the age of twenty-one years, Chinese reckoning, or at such earlier period as his wife might deem advisable. I cannot accept the contention that this gave her a life interest up to the date of distribution.Such a contention appears to me to be inconsistent on the fact of it. In support of this contention I have been referred to the case of Blackwell v. Bull [1836], 1 Keen 176; 48 ER 274.The decision in that can was apparently approved in the case of Ralf v. Carrick 5 Ch. D 984.However, it seems to me to have no bearing on the facts of the case at all.In the case of Blackwell v. Bull [1836], 1 Keen 176 48 ER 274 where it was held that the wife took a life interest by implication, the testator had devised his property in trust that at his wife's decease the whole of it should be equally divided amongst his children.In the will in dispute in this case the property is declared to be distributed at a date which might well be, and in fact is, before the death of the wife.

The next question for consideration is whether this Court can interfere with the discretion given to the applicant under cl 9 of the will.In the case of Costabadie v. Costabadie [1847], 6 Hare 410; 67 ER 1225, it was held that a discretionary power conferred upon the wife by a will not be disturbed by the Court so long as it is reasonably and honestly exercised.In the case of Re Charteris v. Biddulph [1917] 2 Ch 379, a similar decision was given.In the case of Tempest v. Lord Camoys [1882] 21 Ch D 379, the Master of the Rolls stated : - "It is settled law, that when a testator has given a pure discretion to trustees as to the exercise of a power, the Court does not enforce the exercise of the power against the wish of the trustees, but it does prevent them from exercising it improperly." In the case of Re Hodges, Davey v. Ward [1878], 7 Ch D 754, it was held that the Court had the power to control the discretion of the trustees in the allowance to be trade for children, and the Court in fact made an order in opposition to the trustees.In the case of Re Roper's Trusts [1879], 11 Ch D 272, it was held that where a fund was by will given to trustees for infants, and the trustees were desired to pay the i