Whitton J (delivering oral JUDGMENT):

The charge at present before the Court is that the bankrupt contracted on 20 May 1952 a debt of $11,458 due to Montor Ltd. of the Arcade Building, Raffles Place, Singapore, without any reasonable ground of expectation of being able to pay it, and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 114(c) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Ch 15.

Now, the Official Assignee has shown to my satisfaction that at the date the bankrupt contracted this debt, he had in fact liabilities very many times exceeding the amount of this debt and also much exceeding his existing assets at that date.This evidence, in my view, prima facie establishes the case in support of the Official Assignee's motion.

In reply to this case, the Defence puts forward two main grounds; the first is that if the correct view of what for convenience I shall call interest and appropriation aspects of the debts is applied to the bankrupt's situation, the debtor, in view of his admitted assets, was not in fact really insolvent at all.The second ground put forward by Mr. Macassey for the defence is that as the Official Assignee concedes that at the date the debt was contracted the bankrupt had assets exceeding $400,000 and therefore was clearly in a position to pay this particular debt of $11,000 odd, it cannot be said he contracted this debt without any reasonable ground of expectation of being able to pay.To put the matter shortly, he suggests that a man who has assets amounting to something in the nature of $400,000, whatever his liabilities at that date may be, cannot be said to have had no reasonable ground of expectation of being able to pay a debt of $11,000 odd.

As regards this second submission by the defence, the Official Assignee relies on the case of Re Chan Leong Watt [1910], 12 SSLR 32 and on the judgment of Hyndman Jones CJ, therein.Now, I need hardly say that, if I was satisfied that this was a Court of Appeal authority on the particular point in issue now before me, I would of course be bound by that authority, but I am of the view that the case in question cannot be regarded as a Court of Appeal decision on this particular matter.Even looking at that judgment alone, which of course has my very careful consideration, being a judgment of a Judge of the eminence he was, I think that the facts of the present case can be distinguished, and in view of the English cases cited and of the interpretation which appears to me to be the correct one to be placed upon the section, I hold that this second ground must succeed in the circumstance. I do not propose to express any opinion on the matter relating to interest and appropriations.

The motion is therefore dismissed.

Motion dismissed.