1954 MarsdenLR 301
HIGH COURT, SINGAPORE
RE SYED ALWI ALKAFF DECEASED; ALKAFF – Appellant
Versus
ALKAFF & ORS – Respondent
[Originating Summons No 255 Of 1953]
Brown J:
By his will dated 27 April 1924 (the 26th day of Moharam 1343 in the Muslim Calendar) the testator devised certain specific property comprising all the houses Nos 86, 87, 88, 89 and 90 Robinson Road, Singapore.By subsequent Settlement dated 14 April 1925 he conveyed this property to trustees upon trust to convert the 'trust premises" into money and hold the money upon certain trusts.The beneficiaries under the devise contained in the Will are different from the beneficiaries of the trusts contained in the subsequent Settlement.At the end of the Settlement there appears the following proviso:
Provided always and it is hereby agreed and declared that it shall be lawful for the Settlor at any time or times hereafter by any deed or deeds revocable or irrevocable or by will or codicil expressly referring to this power or the property subject thereto wholly or partially to revoke and make void the uses trusts powers and provisions herein declared and contained of and concerning the premises hereby settled and to declare such new or other uses and trusts of and concerning the same or any part or parts thereof as he may think fit for the benefit of himself the Settlor his heirs executors or administrators or of any other person or persons.
Here, then we have a testator who, eight months after making his Will, makes a Settlement containing trusts which are at variance with the Will, reserving to himself a power to revoke the trusts of the Settlement and then a power of appointment for the benefit of himself or anybody else, which power is exercisable by will or codicil provided that such will or codicil expressly refers to the property which is the subject of the power contained in the Settlement.
Mr. Green, in support of the trusts of the Settlement, took the point that the reference to the Robinson Road property in the Will is not a sufficient reference to satisfy the proviso in the Settlement.His argument was that throughout the Settlement until we come to the proviso, the term used is "trust premises", and that the use of a different term in the proviso, viz. "or the property subject thereto," requires a special meaning to be given to it which is something other than the "trust premises." But the whole of the Settlement is concerned with the property which is contained in the first Schedule, which includes the Robinson Road property.The properties in the first Schedule are set out by name.And I think that the reason for not using the term "trust premises" in the proviso is that that term would limit the properties to those which are named and set out in the first Schedule; but if the trustees sold those properties and purchased other properties the settlor wanted those other properties to be covered by the proviso.
The question which I have to determine is whether a will which contains a specific devise can operate as the exercise of a power of appointment contained in a subsequent settlement, where the settlor has power to revoke the trusts of the settlement and then to appoint himself again; or whether in such a case an express intention to revoke the trusts of the settlement and to exercise the power must be shewn.In other words, in the absence of an expressed intention do the trusts of the will prevail over the trusts of the subsequent settlement?
By s. 19 of the Wills Ordinance (Cap. 53) every will is to be construed, with reference to the real estate and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the testator's death, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.By s. 21 of the Ordinance a general devise includes property over which the testator has a general power of appointment.In the present case we are concerned with a specific devise, and it is common ground that s. 21 has no application.Another reason why s. 21 cannot apply to this case is that by the proviso to the Settlement the power is only exercisable by an instrument "expressly r