PC Lord Reid:

The judgement of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was delivered by, Lord Pearce (referred to facts proved by other witnesses which showed conclusively the appellant's intention to open by fraudulent means an account at a bank for another accused under the assumed name of 'Piyadasa' and a false description, an intention which in due course he achieved. This accused presented one of the cheques in question for payment into the account but upon suspicions being aroused he vanished from the premises. His Lordship continued):

In addition to the above matters, there was evidence that some time previously the appellant had made enquiries about opening an account at another bank (the National and Grindlay's Bank), and there was found in the possession of the fourth accused, the forger, a typed letter vouching a Mr. Piyadasa for the purpose of opening an account at that bank. This letter was signed "HB Mendis" but Mr. Mendis who was a customer of the bank had not in fact signed it. The appellant admitted to the police that he had signed this document, and he admitted also writing several signatures "HB Mendis" on two pieces of paper that were found in his possession when he was arrested. These admissions were given in evidence.

At the time of the trial there was some authority which appeared to justify the reception of these admissions. But the case of R v. Ramasamy [1965] AC 1; [1964] 3 WLR 632; Noted in [1965] 1 MLJ at p. ix, has subsequently shown that these admissions should have been excluded. The objection at the trial was based on the ground that the admissions were confessions made to a police officer and as such inadmissible under the Evidence Act s. 25(1) ; but the Court held that they were not confessions*. Before their Lordships the only point taken with regard to the admissions was that on the authority of R v. Ramasamy, supra, they were inadmissible by virtue of s. 122 of the Criminal Procedure Code as being a "statement made by any person to a police officer or an inquirer in the course of any investigation" under Chapter XII of the Code.

Undoubtedly this submission is correct. Mr. Littman attempted to save the admissibility of the evidence by a suggestion that the statements appear on the evidence to have been made, not during the actual interrogation or in answer to any question, but as information volunteered to the police officer while they were climbing the stairs to his office. The appellant was however in custody at the time, and he was interrogated both before and after they climbed the stairs. Mr. Littman's suggestion thus really amounts to a contention that the statement was made between two investigations, a proposition which their Lordships cannot accept.

To hold that information volunteered at any time between the beginning and end of the investigation may be excluded from the protection of s. 122 would in practice defeat the purpose of the section and encourage the mischief against which it is clearly aimed. Nor do the words of the section justify such an interpretation. The protection endures "during the course of the investigation" that is to say from the time when the investigation starts to the time when it ends, and a report is made under ss. 131 & 87;. Their Lordships accept the view expressed by Howard CJ (Ceylon) in R v. Haramanisa [1944], 45 NLR (Ceylon) 532 at p. 537:

The investigation made by a police officer or inquirer under this chapter covers a wide field and is not limited merely to the examination of persons by the putting of questions. The investigation includes the search for incriminating evidence and the examination of the locus in quo and the locality in the vicinity of the scene of the crime. A statement made by any person to a police officer who was so engaged would, in our opinion, be made in the course of any investigation.

Thus the evidence was wrongly admitted. Had this case been tried by a jury, its effect on their minds and t