1993 MarsdenLR 1710
HIGH COURT, KUALA LUMPUR
DATO LIM BENG CHOON J.
S.I. RAJAH
versus
DATO MAK HON KAM
CIVIL SUIT NO. S7-22-599-1990
Decided On : 08-27-93
For the plaintiffs - Dominic Puthucherry; M/s. Skrine &Co. K.S. Dass; M/s. K. Sila Dass & Partners, RejinderSingh; M/s. Ranjit Thomas & Kuala, M.Kayveas; M/s. M. Kayveas & Co. For the defendants - Shahul Hameed; M/s. Albar Zulkifli& Yap, Pala; M/s. Durai & Associates
Lim Beng Choon J:
This suit was instituted by the two plaintiffs on 26 August 1989 in which they are praying inter alia for three declaratory orders: (i) that the 1st to 9th defendants and each of them, were, at all material times, and are, not members of the People's Progressive Party of Malaysia ("the PPP"), (ii) that the appointment of the 1st to the 9th defendants and each of them as office bearers of the PPP be declared null and void; and (iii) that the 10th and 12th defendants and each of them having resigned from their respective posts to which they were elected at the Triennial Delegates Conference of the PPP would cease to hold their respective posts.
They are also praying for orders of Court to restrain each and everyone of the defendants from acting or holding out as office bearers and/or interfering with the affairs and/or from convening any meetings or extraordinary triennial delegates conference of the PPP. Finally they pray for an order of Court directing that in the interim the 1st plaintiff be appointed to attend to the day to day affairs of the PPP under the supervision of the Registrar of Societies or such other person or persons as may be appointed by the said Registrar.
On 28 August 1989 the plaintiffs made an application by way of an ex parte summons-in-chambers for an interim injunction to restrain each and everyone of the defendants from doing the things mentioned above. The application, however, was heard inter partes by me on 22 August 1991 and I granted the interim injunction prayed for subject to the usual order as regards to damages to be paid to the defendants should it be found subsequently that the said injunction should not have been granted. The grounds of my judgment in this interlocutory matter are set out in my written judgment of22 October 1991 (See [1992] 1 CLJ 198 ).
The trial of the case commenced on 8 January 1992 and proceeded until 11 May 1993 when the plaintiffs closed their case. Thereupon Counsel for the defendants orally applied to this Court for leave to raise a preliminary issue pursuant to O. 33 r. 2 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 ("the RHC"). The preliminary issue as stated by the learned Counsel was this:
On the undisputed facts before this Court are the plaintiffs entitled to seek the various prayers that have been prayed for in the statement of claim in view of the proviso to s. 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 ?
Counsel for the plaintiffs strenuously objected to the defendants' application made at this late stage and said that the said application was in fact an abuse of the process of the Court. Furthermore the learned Counsel quite rightly said that the plaintiffs were caught by surprise. I therefore adjourned the hearing until 13 May 1993 to enable Counsel for the plaintiffs to look up the law on the preliminary issue.
The matter was fully argued before me by Counsel of the respective parties on 13 May 1993. I do not propose to dwell on the arguments of Counsels as I have given a written judgment on this preliminary issue on 24 May 1993. Suffice it to state that Counsel for the defendants submitted that even if the Court were to look at the plaintiffs' case at its highest, in law the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reliefs asked for. Counsel also said that the facts relied on by the defendants in raising the preliminary issue were these:
1. As the 1st plaintiff is a bankrupt and not holding an official post in the PPP he therefore has no right to ask for the reliefs sought. 2. In any event based on their own pleadings both the plaintiffs are not entitled in law to pray for and to obtain the reliefs as set out in their statement of claim.
On the other hand Counsel for the plaintiffs argued inter alia that:
(1) The purported issue of law that the Counsel for the defendants has raised is not in fact an issue of law in that the statement of claim of 26 August 1989 raises matters based on antecendent events which took place in 1988 when the 1st p