Rigby J:

This is an appeal from a decision of the learned President of the Sessions Court granting to the respondent, the plaintiff in that action, an Order for the recovery of possession of a piece of land on which the appellant had built two houses. The respondent had recently purchased the land from its previous owner. The statement of claim averred - and the allegation was not specifically traversed - that the houses were premises of a temporary character. It would appear that the appellant many years ago had leased the land, as vacant land, from the previous owner and had been paying ground rent of $1 per month. During the period of his occupancy of the land he had, according to the statement of defence, with the consent of the owner of the land, erected these two houses on the land for the occupancy of himself and his family.

The learned President held that the parties were bound by their pleadings and there was no denial by the present appellant that the houses were of a temporary character. He held, in substance, that the houses were buildings of a temporary character and, following the decisions of this Court in Evelyn Saw Hee Li V. Gan Tit Sun and Mayor Singh v. Lau Geok Swee, that they were not protected by the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1956, and that the respondent was entitled to an Order for recovery of possession - due notice quit having, of course, been properly given.

Mr. Hume, for the appellant, now contends that the houses, even as buildings of a temporary character were in fact protected by the Control of Rent Ordinance and that the two decisions of this Court, to which I have referred and upon which the learned President clearly relied, were bad in law.

I am glad of an opportunity to refer to the Evelyn Saw Hee Li case since I am of the opinion that certain dicta I there expressed went too far. I held that having regard to the definition of "premises" as contained in s. 2 of the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1956, land, qua land, did not come within the definition of "premises" and therefore - to quote from the words of the judgment itself - "if a person chooses to take a lease of a piece of land and builds a house on it, whether it be with or without the consent of the owner of the land, he cannot thereafter avail himself of the protection of this Ordinance as it now stands." In that context I think a clear distinction must be drawn between buildings of a temporary character, as known and accepted in this country (see the case of Chua Sai Ngoh v. Beh Ai Meng [1955] MLJ 167) and houses of a permanent character which become fixtures to the land and accordingly form part of the reality. Fixtures become part of the land immediately upon their annexation to the soil and their ownership becomes vested at once in the owner of the land upon such annexation. Section 12(1) of the Ordinance provides that:

No order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any premises comprised in a tenancy shall be made or given except..............

It is important to observe that the words used in the section are "comprised in a tenancy" and not "the subject matter of a tenancy." I think the words "premises comprised in a tenancy" must mean and include all those premises included in the tenancy as at the date of its determination or as at the date of the application for a Court Order for possession, and are not to be construed as being confined to premises which were originally the subject matter of the tenancy. (See, by analogy, the interpretation put by the Court on the words "comprised in the settlement" in the case of Re Moore, Moore v. Bigg [1906] 1 Ch. 789). If that be the true construction to be placed upon the words "premises comprised in a tenancy" then it must follow that where there has been a lease granted by a landlord of vacant land and a dwelling house of a permanent attaches to the reality and becomes from the character (which by virtue of its permanency attaches to the reality and becomes from the