In this case two charges were preferred against the accused in the sessions court at Melaka. They are as follows:

First charge

Bahawa kamu pada 10 Jun 1995 lebih kurang jam 6.35 petang di rumah No 3501-6 Taman Imigresen, Tanjung Kling, di dalam Daerah Melaka Tengah di dalam Negeri Melaka telah secara rasuah meminta suatu suapan iaitu pertolongan seks dari seorang Iee Bee Fong sebagai dorongan kepada kamu iaitu seorang pegawai imigresen di Jabatan Imigresen Melaka untuk mempercepatkan perlanjutan tempoh sahlaku paspot Malaysia No 4917928 kepunyaan Iee Bee Fong tersebut dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 3(a)(ii) Akta Pencegah Rasuah 1961 (Akta 57).

Second Charge

Bahawa kamu pada 17 Jun 1995 lebih kurang pukul 8.50 malam di Tip Top

Guest House, Taman Melaka Raya, di dalam Daerah Melaka Tengah, di dalam

Negeri Melaka, sebagai ejen kepada Kerajaan Malaysia, iaitu seorang

pegawai imigresen yang bertugas di Jabatan Imigresen Melaka, telah

secara rasuah cuba mendapat untuk diri kamu suatu suapan, iaitu,

pertolongan seks dari Iee Bee Fong tersebut sebagai dorongan untuk kamu

melakukan sesuatu perbuatan berhubung dengan hal ehwal prinsipal kamu,

iaitu, membantu Iee Bee Fong mendapatkan perlanjutan tempoh sahlaku

Paspot Malaysia No 4917928 kepunyaan Iee Bee Fong dan dengan itu kamu

telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 4(a) Akta

Pencegah Rasuah 1961 (Akta 57).

The accused claimed trial to both the charges. The substance of the allegation against the accused is that he had solicited sexual favours from the complainant in return for expediting the renewal of her international passport. Evidence relating to that allegation was therefore of critical importance to the prosecution. The smooth flow of the prosecutions case was short circuited by an objection raised by the defence on the admissibility of certain evidence to be adduced by them from the complainant on an alleged conversation between her and the accused relating to his request for sexual favours after three witnesses had given formal evidence. Learned counsel for the defence based his objection on s 31A(1) of the Evidence Act 1950 (the Act), to which I shall refer in more detail shortly, and said that it applies to any statement made by any person, which would include the accused, and that such evidence should therefore be only admitted in evidence in accordance with the requirements of the section. He added that as the evidence to be given by the complainant would fall within that section it is therefore inadmissible unless given as prescribed. The learned sessions court judge upheld the objection raised resulting in the prosecution being precluded from adducing in evidence the:

(a) oral conversation between the accused and the complainant at the

Immigration Department, Melaka on 7 June 1995;

(b) tape recorded telephone conversation between the accused and the

complainant on 10 June 1995 between 5 pm and 6 pm;

(c) tape recorded conversation between the accused and the complainant on

10 June 1995 at the Ramada Hotel, Melaka;

(d) tape recorded telephone conversation between the accused and the

complainant on the afternoon of 17 June 1995; and

(e) the tape recorded telephone conversation between the accused and the

complainant on the evening of 17 June 1995.

The prosecution was therefore compelled to close its case without adducing material evidence that it had on the principal issue to be proved. The learned sessions court judge then promptly acquitted and discharged the accused without calling upon him to enter his defence. This appeal is by the prosecution against the order made.

When the appeal came up for hearing before me on 17 January 1997 the learned deputy public prosecutor contended that pursuant to the defence objection being upheld, the prosecution was unable to adduce the evidence as enu