Rigby J (delivering oral judgment):

The learned DPP, Mr. Massie, quite rightly concedes that on the authorities he Cannot support the conviction in this case and that the appeal ought to be allowed. The result is singularly unfortunate since the appeal itself is wholly devoid of any merits on the facts.

The appellant was charged, together with two other persons, with assisting in the "management" of a public lottery, to wit, 100, 1,000, and 19,000 character lotteries, contrary to the provisions of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance, 1953. Under the provisions of that Ordinance there is no such offence created as "it assisting in the management of a public lottery". The charge, therefore, was bad in law since it disclosed no offence, and the trial and consequent conviction was a nullity. (See the case of Chong Chee Pak v. PP [1948-49] MLJ Supp 45). The appellant on the facts could, and should, have been charged with the offence created under the provisions of the Ordinance of "assisting in carrying on a public lottery". I have seriously considered whether in the interests of justice I ought not to amend the charge at this stage and, on the facts, convict the appellant of what would have been the correct charge of assisting in carrying on a public lottery. But the same point fell for consideration before Whyatt CJ, in the Singapore case of Quek Ching Kim v. Reg [1956] MLJ 54. His Lordship in that case agreed with the attitude taken by Counsel for the Crown that having regard to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code before any amendment to a charge was made such amendment should be read and explained to the accused who should be called upon to plead to the charge as amended. His Lordship, agreeing with the view taken by Counsel for the Crown in that appeal, held that it was then too late to amend the charge so as to bring it within the provisions of the Common Gaming Houses Ordinance. In the result, unsatisfactory as it may be, I must hold that the trial and conviction in this case was a nullity and that the conviction must accordingly be quashed. The fine, if paid, must be refunded to the appellant.

Conviction quashed.