Terrell JA:

The facts and arguments sufficiently appear from the judgment.

The plaintiff is the owner of premises known as No. 6 Orange Grove Road, Singapore. For some months before March 1941 the defendant had been the tenant of the house on a monthly tenancy, but in March he was not in occupation, having sublet. About this time the plaintiff received notice to quit the premises which he himself was occupying, and required No. 6 Orange Grove Road for his own use. The defendant was not willing to give up possession, and on 5 March 1941 the plaintiff applied under the provisions of s. 8 of the Increase of Rent (Restriction) Ordinance 1939, to eject him. The application came before the Rent Board on 25 March 1941, when the plaintiff was given liberty to proceed. Notice to quit was duly given and when not complied with, ejectment proceedings were commenced. The defendant alleged that he was entitled to two months' notice. Without contesting this point, the plaintiff discontinued, and gave a fresh notice to quit the premises on or before 31 August 1941.

On 11 July 1941 the defendant applied to the Rent Board to set aside their previous order on the ground (inter alia) that the plaintiff had alternative accommodation in a house belonging to him and known as No. 11 Bishopsgate, Singapore. The application came before the Board on 22 July, when the plaintiff offered 11 Bishopsgate to the defendant if he vacated 6 Orange Grove Road. The hearing was adjourned to enable defendant's Counsel to consult his client. The plaintiff gave the defendant the keys of 11 Bishopsgate and the latter went over the house, incidentally leaving it with all the doors and windows open. On 4 August he refused to accept 11 Bishopsgate as alternative accommodation. When the application was heard on 12 August 1941 the Board refused to review the previous order.

Notwithstanding this rebuff the defendant was not discouraged, and on 29 August 1941 made yet one more application to the Rent Board to set aside their order of 12 August, that is to say, the order refusing to vary the previous order of 25 March. It appeared that having refused 11 Bishopsgate on 4 August the defendant had changed his mind when the Board rejected his application on 12 August and was now prepared to accept the alternative accommodation previously offered. The plaintiff, however, was not prepared to renew his offer. The application was heard on 2 September. Dr Withers Payne, defendant's Counsel, admitted that it was not a legal requirement that alternative accommodation should be offered. There is no record of any other argument presented to the Board, and Counsel concluded with a request for one month's suspension. The Board considered this reasonable, and asked plaintiff's Counsel if he would agree to not ejecting defendant before 30 September. Mr. Ong, on behalf of the plaintiff acceded to this suggestion. The Board however again refused to revise its previous decision that the plaintiff should be at liberty to eject the defendant.

After the hearing by the Board on 2 September the plaintiff's solicitors received a cheque for the September rent. In acknowledging the cheque that same afternoon, the plaintiff's solicitors wrote to the defendant's solicitors as follows:-

Our client states, in view of the opinion expressed by the Rent Board this afternoon, that he is quite prepared to allow your client to remain on the premises until 30 September 1941. It is however to be clearly understood that no further extension of time will be granted to your client after 30 September 1941 and that the notice to quit still stands.

The defendant's solicitors acknowledged this letter without comment the following day.

Now the Ordinance was amended on 4 July 1941, that is to say, s. 8 had been amended before either of the defendant's applications to the Rent Board on 11 July and 29 August 1941 to set aside the order of the Board of 25 March 1941. In view of Dr Withers Payne's arguments befor