Wilson DJ:

(1) On account of certain suspicions some officers of the Monopolies Departments were posted to watch the premises of the appellant who was accused No. 4 in DC 1592/32. I accept their version of what they saw.

(2) At 6.30 a.m. on 4 August 1932 a lorry drove up to the premises. The appellant helped to carry two baskets of vegetables into the shop. When the men accompanying the lorry saw the Revenue Officers they tried to escape thus proving their guilty knowledge. Similarly the accused locked the door leading into the back part of his premises and was seen throwing the bag containing a motor tube of bukit samsu over the party wall into the back yard of the next door house.

(3) No question of a plant can therefore arise. Accused took in the liquor himself and got rid of it without examining it proving he was expecting liquor and knew what the bag contained.

(4) The petition of appeal says that the conviction is bad in law. All Magistrates will be grateful to the Judges of the Supreme Court if they will consider making it a rule of practice that legal points to be raised on appeal should be set out in the petition. A normal sentence of mine was needlessly reduced in the past in a case in which an acting DPP at the close of the hearing of the appeal was suddenly confronted with the statement that anyway the sentence was illegal. Neither he, the Judge, nor Counsel had any reason to know that Revenue Ordinances contain special 'in lieu' sections. These sections are not prominently set out in the ordinances but are constantly referred to in this Court. While asking for this change I deprecate any idea that a Magistrate should in his grounds of judgment seem to argue the law with appellant.

(5) The question of sentence is not specifically raised in the petition but it may come up. If it is raised I make the same suggestion as in para. (4) for the same reason namely that the Magistrate is usually in possession of knowledge of the state of crime and such like things which bear on sentence.

(6) In the case of a licence holder offending seriously against a revenue ordinance I do not think he should get the benefit of the leniency shown to first offenders. The circumstances usually shew that, as in the present case, the offence was one of series. Also I hold that his previous good character got him the license and should not be pleaded again in his favour.

(7) Over an hour of my time every day is taken up with Revenue Cases as I now hear all Chandu, Liquor and Tobacco Cases. I therefore see more than any one else except preventive officers the extent of the attempts to defeat the provisions of these Ordinances.

(8) Between 50% and 60% of the Revenue of this Colony come from duties collected under these Ordinances, and nearly $340,000 are spent annually on prevention. In times like the present when every dollar must be collected to pay for the salaries of Government officers and the other expenses of Government I consider it my duty to punish severely any attempts to defraud the public revenue. Again it is impossible for properly run liquor shops to compete with those selling 'bukit' samsu. For these reasons I considered a fine of $500 on the licensee of a shop as the minimum I could inflict for a grave breach of the Revenue laws, a breach which shewed every sign of being systematic. I have taken into consideration the fact that the licensee will also lose his licence. Otherwise the fine would have been $1,000.

The accused appealed to the Supreme Court and the Appeal was heard on 3 October 1932 by Murison CJ, who upheld the conviction but reduced the fine to $250.

JUDGMENT

Murison CJ:

The appellant in this case appeals against his conviction (with four others) for keeping on his licensed premises No. 281 Serangoon Road, dutiable liquor in contravention of ss. 40(1) and 77 of the Liquors' Revenue Ordinance 1927. This Ordinance is incorrectly described in the charge, but no point was made of it in the appeal.