Jeffrey Tan J:

On 16 June 1995, both defendants were ordered, by a judgment in default of their appearance, to pay the plaintiff the sum of RM608,975.69 and costs. This is the plaintiff's appeal (end. 19), to judge in chambers, against the order of the learned senior assistant registrar, of 13 September 1996, setting aside that judgment in default.

An appeal to a judge in chambers from the decision of a registrar of the High Court is an actual rehearing and the judge treats the matter as though it comes before him for the first time (Tuan Haji Abdul Rahman v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Berhad [1996] 1 CLJ 241 , per Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ; see also Seloga Jaya Sdn. Bhd. v. Pembinaan Keng Ting (Sabah) Sdn. Bhd. [1994] 2 CLJ 716 ); it works out, therefore, that the plaintiff's appeal is, in effect, the defendants' application to set aside the judgment in default of appearance.

A judgment entered in default is not a judgment decided on merits (L Oppenheim & Co v. Mohamed Heneef [1922] 1 AC 482) and is liable, as it does not finally dispose off the rights of the parties, to be set aside (Re: Udos ak Riging; ex parte Seabanc Kredit Sdn. Bhd. [1994] 3 MLJ 383).

As Lord Atkin, in Evan