JUDGMENT

Abdul Malik Ishak J:

This was an application by way of a Notice of Motion in encl. 2 by the applicant for an order of certiorari to remove into this court for the purpose of quashing the Industrial Court award number 35 of 1997 that was made on 23 January 1997. A judicial review by way of a certiorari must be the best remedy available to the applicant. A judicial review is not an appeal from the decision of the Industrial Court but rather it is a review of the manner in which the decision was made. This court is not entitled on an application for judicial review to consider whether the decision of the Industrial Court itself, on the merits of the facts, was fair and reasonable. I draw support for my views on the prevailing law by reference to passages in the judgments of Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C. and Lord Brightman in the case of Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C. at pp. 143 to 144 of the judgment succinctly said:

This remedy, vastly increased in extent, and rendered, over a long period in recent years, of infinitely more convenient access than that provided by the old prerogative writs and actions for a declaration, is intended to protect the individual against the abuse of power by a wide range of authorities, judicial, quasi-judicial, and, as would originally have been thought when I first practised at the Bar, administrative. It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and discretions properly vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions.

It is intended to see that the relevant authorities use their powers in a proper manner.

Since the range of authorities, and the circumstances of the use of their power, are almost infinitely various, it is of course unwise to lay down rules for the application of the remedy which appear to be of universal validity in every type of case. But it is important to remember in every case that the purpose of the remedies is to ensure that the individual is given fair treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected and that it is no part of that purpose to substitute the opinion of the judiciary or of individual judges for that of the authority constituted by law to decide the matters in question. The function of the court is to see that lawful authority is not abused by unfair treatment and not to attempt itself the task entrusted to that authority by the law. There are passages in the judgment of Lord Denning M.R. (and perhaps in the other judgments of the Court of Appeal) in the instant case and quoted by my noble and learned friend which might be read as giving the courts carte blanche to review the decision of the authority on the basis of what the courts themselves consider fair and reasonable on the merits. I am not sure whether Lord Denning M.R. really intended his remarks to be construed in such a way as to permit the court to examine, as for instance in the present case, the reasoning of the subordinate authority with a view to submitting its own opinion. If so, I do not think this is a correct statement of principle.

The purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised or enjoined by law to decide for itself a conclusion which is correct in the eyes of the court.

Lord Brightman had this to say at p. 154 of the judgment:

I turn secondly to the proper purpose of the remedy of judicial review, what it is and what it is not. In my opinion the law was correctly stated in the speech of Lord Evershed [1963] 2 All ER 66 at 91, [1964] AC 40 at 96. His was a dissenting judgment but the dissent was not concerned with this point.

Lord Evershed referred to:

a danger of usurpation of power on the part of the courts ... under the pretext of having regard to the principles of natural justice ... I do