1949 MarsdenLR 57
HIGH COURT SINGAPORE
NG KIM BENG – Appellant
Versus
TAY SIONG CHUAN – Respondent
[District Court Appeal No: 17 Of 1948- App Civil Juris]
JUDGMENT
[1] This case raises a short but very important point in regard to lettings in the Colony where the tenant has the exclusive use of some rooms in a house and shares certain accommodation in the same house with others.
[2] The agreed facts are that the defendant is the tenant to the plaintiff of two rooms on the first floor of the house in question and has the right to use, in common with his landlord, the plaintiff, the back portion of the ground floor of the house which he uses as a dining room, the kitchen where each has his own cooking space, the bathroom and lavatory. The question is whether or not in these circumstances, the Control of Rent Ordinance applies.
[3] In the Control of Rent Ordinance "premises" is defined, leaving out im material words, as "any dwelling house... and any part of any premises let or sublet separately". It follows that before the Ordinance can apply there must bea letting of a dwelling house as a whole or a letting of any part of house separately.
[4] The point taken by the plaintiff is that the part of the house that was let to the defendant was not let "separately" and that in this case, it is contended, there is a sharing of the house and that accordingly, the Control of Rent Ordinance does not apply. Reliance is placed upon Neale v. Del Soto [1945] 1 AER 191 where it was held that where there was a letting of certain rooms in a house together with the right to use the kitchen in common with the landlord,there was no letting as a separate dwelling house. This case was followed in Cole v. Harris [1945] 2 AER 146, where certain rooms which did not include a kitchen were used in common by the landlord and two tenants.
[5] Mr Morrison has urged that the English decisions do not apply as the Rent Restriction Acts are not the same as the Colony Ordinance. I am well aware that the English Acts and the Control of Rent Ordinance of Singapore are not in pari materia and I am also well aware of the danger of relying on cases decidedon the law of England where such law is not in pari materia with our local law. In Leonard v. Nachiappa Chetty 4 FMSLR 265, the learned Judge said:
Before reliance can be placed on English decisions, particularly decisions on points of procedure it is necessary in the first instance to examine carefully your local law and to ascertain what it is and in what respects it resembles or differs from the English law.
[6] The English decisions upon which reliance is placed in this case depended upon the construction of s 12(2) of the Act of 1920 and s 16(1) of the Act of 1933. The former reads: "This Act shall apply to a house or part of a house let as a separate dwelling..." and in the latter," 'dwelling house' has the same meaning as in the principal Acts, namely a house let as a separate dwelling or a part of a house being a part so let". The material and relevant words in the definition of "premises" in the local Ordinance is "any part of any premises let or sublet separately". In my view "separately" here means what it says, namely as a separate premises.
[7] In the present case the right to use the ground floor, the kitchen, the bathroom and lavatory cannot be separated in my view from the exclusive use of the two rooms on the first floor. In my view, the two rooms let by the plaintiff to the defendant are not "in any part of any premises let or sublet separately". What was let were the two rooms together with the use in common with the plaintiff of the ground floor, bathroom, kitchen and lavatory. Adopting the language of Morton LJ in Neale v. Del Soto [1945] 1 AER 191 the real substance of the matter here is that there was a sharing of this house each party had the exclusive use of some rooms and the two parties had the use in common of certain other rooms.
[8] For these reasons, in my opinion, this letting was never within the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1947. It follows in my Judgment that the term and interest of the defendant, having been duly determined by a l