Chang Min Tat J:

This was an application by Originating Summons under the provisions of O. 54A of the Rules of the Supreme Court for certain declaratory orders. The first two orders sought involved the construction of r. 3(1) of the Rules of the Electrical Industry Workers Union and the next two the interpretation of s. 2(2) of the Trade Unions Ordinance, 1959.

The declarations asked for, as amended, are in these terms:

a) A declaration that the Applicant Union has the exclusive power to decide whether the workers employed by the company registered as Monsanto Electronic Sdn. Bhd. are within the scope of membership of the said Union under r. 3(1) of the Union's Rules.

b) A declaration that the said Union is entitled to register the said workers as its members.

c) A declaration that the Registrar of Trade Unions is not empowered under s. 2(2) of the Trade Unions Ordinance, 1959 or at all to rule on the eligibility of the said workers to join the said Union.

d) A declaration that the Registrar of Trade Unions has no power under s. 2(2) of the Trade Union Ordinance or at all to forbid the said Union from taking in the said workers as its members.

The matter arose from the attempt by the Union to absorb into its fold the workers employed by Monsanto Electronics Sdn. Bhd. The Union thought that these workers came within its membership clause, as being persons engaged in similar trades, occupations or industries. The Registrar of Trade Unions thought otherwise. In his view electronic was not synonymous with electrical and a worker employed by that firm did not come within the definition of worker in the Union's rules. He therefore refused to allow the enlistment of the workers of the Monsanto Electronics Sdn. Bhd. into the Electrical Industry Workers Union.

In so doing, he purported to act under s. 2(2) of the Trade Unions Ordinance 1959 which reads:

2(2) For the purposes of the definition of 'trade union' in sub-section (1) in for the purposes of ss. 72 and 74 'similar' means similar in the opinion of the Registrar.

It should be noted at this stage that his opinion was not conclusive. Section 17(1) of the Trade Unions Ordinance gives a right of appeal to the Minister of Labour and Manpower within 30 days against his decision. Section 17(4) provides that the decision of the Minister on appeal shall be final and shall not be called into question in any Court.

No objection was taken however by the respondents upon the ground that the proper recourse of the applications was by way of appeal from the decision of the Registrar to the Minister or that the Court was not by statutory intervention properly seized of the matter, until, at the least, the Minister had made his order.

Objection was however taken to the form of the application. It was argued as a preliminary point that the application did not properly come within the scope of O. 54A of the Rules of the Supreme Court and that in the absence of any provision for such a matter, the application should be by action. This objection was founded on the recent judgment of my brother Abdoolcader J in Sungai Wangi Estate v. Uni . But in that case, what the learned Judge held was that no declaration could be applied for by way of originating motion save in such cases as have been expressly provided for by statute.

Insofar as an originating summons under O. 54A is concerned, the decision must be determined by the consideration whether the subject matter came within the provisions of this Order.

Mr. DP Vijandran contended that the construction of the rules of the trade union came within O. 54 r. 1, but to my mind, the rules could not, by the ejusdem generis principle of construction, come within the "deed, will or other written instrument" in that rule.

The application of the second set of orders said to involve the construction of s. 2(2) of the Trade Unions Ordinance could by the provisions of r. 1A be brought on an originating summons, but if I am right in using the e