Salleh Abas LP:

The respondent who is the Leader of Opposition is seeking the aid of the Court to Interfere in the affairs of a proposed privatisation contract for the construction of North and South Highway due to be signed between the United Engineers (M) Bhd. (UEM), (appellant in appeal No. 456/1987) and the Government of Malaysia, (appellant in appeal No. 434/1987) by asking for a declaration that the letter of intent issued by the Government to UEM in respect of the North and South Highway (NSH) contract is invalid and based on the premise he also prays for a permanent injunction to restrain UEM from signing it with the Government .

On 18 August 1987 he filed a suit to that effect at Penang High Court and on the same day applied by way of an ex parte Summons-in-Chambers for an interim injunction against UEM to restrain it from signing the NSH contract. The application was heard by Edgar Joseph Jr. J. He refused the application but on appeal to the Supreme Court (Tan Sri Lee Hun Hoe CJ Borneo, Wan Suleiman and Wan Hamzah) the Court ordered the interim injunction to be issued "with liberty to apply" and at the same time directed an early trial of the suits.

Soon after this UEM and the Government applied to the High Court to have the interim injunction set aside and the suits struck out on the ground that they disclosed no reasonable cause of action and also for lack of locus standi, in addition to being frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of Court's process. These two applications were heard together by V.C. George J and in a long written judgment the learned Judge dismissed them. Thus the suits and the interim injunction stayed on and so both UEM and the Government appeal to the Supreme Court and hence the case once again came to this Court for the second time.

Confusing as these appeals may appear to be, my decision should centre only on the following questions:

(a) whether the respondent/plaintiff has a cause of action to maintain a suit against the United Engineers;

(b) whether his application for an injunctive remedy is not contrary to s. 29 of the Government Proceedings Act;

(c) whether he has locus standi, i.e., title to bring and maintain the suit against the Government;

(d) whether the oral judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on 25 August 1987 was a final one; and

(e) even if he has locus standi, whether his complaint is one in respect of which the Court's discretion to grant or refuse the remedy of declaration should be exercised in is favour.

(a) Cause of Action

The first issue is whether or not the respondent's statement of claim discloses any cause of action at all in order to enable him to maintain the suit against UEM. If it does not, the application by UEM to strike out the suit and consequently its appeal should both be allowed.

What then is the meaning of "a cause of action"? "A cause of action" is a statement of facts alleging that a plaintiff's right, either at law or by statute, has, in some way or another, been adversely affected or prejudiced by the act of a defendant in an action. Lord Diplock in Letang v. Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 at 242 defined "a cause of action" to mean "a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person". In my view the factual situation spoken of by Lord Diplock must consist of a statement alleging that first the responden /plaintiff has a right either at law or by statute and that secondly such right has been affected or prejudicated by the appellant/defendant's act.

Going through the respondent's statement of claim I found nothing in its which shows the existence of such factual situation. The respondent has no legal relationship with UEM, which would indicate the existence of any legal right or duty in the relation between them. He is a complete stranger to the Company. It is not shown that the respondent is a shareholder or has any interest, directly or indirectly, in the running of the