(delivering the judgment of the Court): The appellant was convicted in the High Court at Kuala Lumpur on two offences under section 57(1) of the Internal Security Act, 1960, one for having in his possession in a security area without lawful excuse certain firearms to wit, an unnumbered .38 llama Pistol, a short barrel Smith & Wesson .38 Revolver No. D. 888858 and an unnumbered .32 Chamber Revolver, the other in respect of certain ammunition to wit, 8 rounds of .32 ammunition, 33 rounds of .38 ammunition, 45 rounds of .22 ammunition and a primed handgrenade and sentenced to death.

The said firearms and ammunition were discovered at about 10.15 a.m. on July 30, 1976 in a locked drawer of a locked almirah at house No. 685 Kampong Tasek Permai Baru, Ampany, which belonged to the sister of the appellant. The appellant had earlier been arrested together with one Hong Chai at 12.30 a.m. on the same day in a house No. 20 Jalan Harvey, Sitiawan, Perak. In a room occupied by the appellant Inspector Nawawi also found 2 sets of keys on the floor beside a mattress. The main evidence on which the appellant was convicted was his oral statement made to Inspector Nawawi soon after his arrest that the keys which subsequently were used to open the almirah and drawer belonged to him.

Regulation 21(1) of the Essential (Security cases) (Amendment) Regulations, 1975 provides:

"A statement made by the accused whether orally or in writing to any person shall be admissible in evidence notwithstanding that such statement —"

was made in circumstances or was of the nature specified in paragraphs (a) to (g) thereof.

This court in Johnson Tan Han Seng v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 66 has ruled that a statement made under the said regulation 21(1) was not admissible unless is was voluntarily made. Suffian L.P. in the course of his judgment in that case said:

"Regulation 21 does not say that a statement to a police officer is admissible whether made voluntarily or not, and so the prosecution must still prove that it was voluntarily made if they wanted to rely on it.…'

In a serious case like this, which involved the death sentence, the trial judge should have considered whether or not the statement was made voluntarily. As he had not done so the statement was not admissible in evidence.

The rest of the evidence was not enough to support the conviction and we therefore allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction and set aside the sentence.