(delivering the judgment of the Court): Cik Faridah binte Harun, Madam Tamishmathi d/o Kuppusamy and Miss Margaret De Cruz, typist, stenographer and typist respectively ("employees") employed by Lindeteves-Jacoberg (M) Sdn. Bhd., ("the company") were retrenched and received identically worded letters dated September 30, 1977, from the company saying that the company had to retrench them with effect from October 1, 1977, owing to a "serious downturn" in turnover and profits during the preceding years.

The retrenchment was disputed by their union, the respondents, and the dispute was reported to the Ministry but it could not be resolved. Eventually by letter dated November 19, 1977, the Minister for Labour and Manpower wrote to the President of the Industrial Court reporting that a dispute had arisen between the company and the union and referring the dispute to the Industrial Court under section 26(2) of the Industrial Relations Act, Act 177 ("the Act").

On November 11, 1978, the Industrial Court made their award, ordering reinstatement of all three employees.

On December 19 the company obtained leave to move the High Court for an order of certiorari to remove into the High Court the award of the Industrial Court for the purpose of its being quashed.

On August 30, 1979, the substantive motion was heard by Abdul Hamid J., as he then was, and in a reserved judgment delivered on December 6, he quashed the award, because, he said,

"This court finds that the Industrial Court had erred in law and the error is apparent on the fact of the record."

The union appeals against that judgment.

That judgment had been delivered before the judgment of the Privy Council was delivered some six months later on June 24, 1980, in South East Asia Fire Bricks Sdn Bhd v Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturers Employees Union & Ors ("Fire Bricks") [1980] 2 MLJ 165; [1980] 3 WLR 318.

The Privy Council there considered the effect of section 29(3)(a) of the Act (now section 32(3)(a)) which reads:

"Subject to this Act, an award of the [Industrial] Court shall be final and conclusive, and no award shall be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any court."

Several judges sitting singly in the High Court had held that the above provision did not prohibit them from quashing an award of the Industrial Court if it contained an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

But in Fire Bricks [1980] 2 MLJ 165; [1980] 3 WLR 318, their Lordships held:

(1) that section 29(3)(a) did prohibit the High Court from quashing an award of the Industrial Court by certiorari proceedings, if it merely made an error of law on the face of the record which did not affect its jurisdiction;

and, following the House of Lords decision in Anis minic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147, further held that:

(2) when words in a statute oust the power of the High Court to review decisions of an inferior tribunal by certiorari, they must be construed strictly;

(3) it has that power if the inferior tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or "if it has done something in the course of the inquiry which is of such a nature that its decision is a nullity" (per Lord Reid at page 171);

(4) but if the inferior tribunal has merely made an error of law which does not affect its jurisdiction, and if its decision is not a nullity for some reason such as breach of the rules of natural justice, then the ouster will be effective; and

(5) the suggestion by Lord Denning in Pearlman v Harrow School [1979] 1 QB 56, 70 that the distinction between an error of law which affected jurisdiction (quashable) and one which did not (not quashable) should be discarded, was not accepted. The court can correct an error of law of the inferior tribunal if the tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction, as opposed to merely making an error of law in its judgment by misinterpreting the statute in question.

In Fire Bricks [1980] 2 MLJ 165; [1980]