(delivering the judgment of the Court): This is an appeal from the decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner, Seremban, which itself arose from the decision of the Seremban Magistrate giving judgment for the appellant/plaintiff. The facts are as follows:

The appellant is the holder of a temporary occupation licence (TOL) in respect of a piece of land held under L.T.S. No. 1544 of Mukim of Rasah, Seremban. The TOL was originally issued to her husband, but after his death, the Seremban Collector of Land Revenue has since September 10, 1974 issued it to her. Two houses were built on the land, one of which was built in 1974after the death of the appellant's husband. This house is now in occupation by the respondent. The appellant claims that the house was built by her and that she gratuitously allowed the respondent to live in it for two months only commencing October 20, 1974 and that she wanted him to vacate the premises by December, 1974. When he refused to do so, the appellant through her solicitors sent a notice dated February 21, 1976 to the respondent to quit. As the notice was ignored by him she sued the respondent for delivery of vacant possession of the house and for damages for holding over. The respondent on the other hand defended the suit claiming that he has the right to stay on because firstly the house was his which he built at the request and consent of the appellant and secondly because the appellant executed a document (Exhibit D8) in his favour allowing him to live on the land.

The learned Magistrate after hearing the evidence of both sides found that the house in question was built by the respondent at the request and with the consent of the appellant, but further held that although it was so built the respondent had no equitable estoppel against the appellant because the principle of Inwards & Ors v Baker [1965] 1 All ER 446 was not applicable. According to the learned Magistrate equitable estoppel only applies when the person, against whom the principle is invoked, is the owner of the land in question. Since the appellant is a mere TOL holder she "has no interest in the land. She is merely a licensee who has occupational or personal right over the land". Yet despite the ruling she introduced Inwards & Ors. v. Baker (supra) by the back door because she further held that the respondent, however, "did obtain an interest on the construction of the house with the consent and knowledge of the" appellant and that having regard to the nature of the respondent's interest as one that could not be terminated by a short period of notice the interest came to an end "somewhere five years from the date of notice", i.e. on February 21, 1981 (the date of notice being February 21, 1976). She therefore gave judgment to the appellant and ordered the respondent to deliver vacant possession and to pay $160/— by way of damages for staying over.

We must confess here that we found difficulties in following the logic of the learned Magistrate's ruling and we are just as puzzled as was the learned Judicial Commissioner who heard the appeal in the court below as to how the respondent acquired his interest if Inwards v. Baker (supra) was not applicable and why it was terminated somewhere five years after the date of the notice, i.e. February 21, 1981 or why it was terminated at all. Probably the learned Magistrate must have thought that the right of the respondent might well be derived from the document D8, which she held to be a perfectly valid document and not in contravention of section 68 of the National Land Code.

In the hearing before the learned Judicial Commissioner the latter accepted the finding of fact by the learned Magistrate that the house was built by the respondent at the request and consent of the appellant. He also agreed with her that the document D8 was not an assignment of the TOL and that it was therefore not in contravention of section 68 of the National Land Code. He, however, disagre