The matter before me is a simple one. Mr. K. S. Chung for the plaintiff has raised five serious points. I need only deal with the last one, the fifth point, that on the subject of delay.

First, I accept the decision in Plimmer Bros v St Maur (1906) 26 NZLR 294. In that case, Stout, C.J. in New Zealand, on an application to remove a caveat, on facts similar to the present case, where the defendant had commenced no action against the plaintiff relating to the land in respect of which a caveat was lodged, referred to several reported cases and said—

"It was his duty to commence an action promptly if he considered himself entitled to specific performance…. Here nothing was done for nearly sixteen months, and then a caveat was lodged. More than a month has elapsed since then, and still no action has been commenced. In my opinion an action for specific performance under such circumstances would be hopeless, and a caveat under such circumstances must be deemed vexatious … in my opinion, to prevent a man dealing with his property after such a long delay is so inequitable that the court will not lend its assistance to such a proceeding."

Next, there is a Singapore decision of the learned Chief Justice in O.S. No. 192 of 1976 where he held that a delay of 2½ months was sufficient for a caveat to be removed forthwith.

In this case on the facts before me I find that there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay. The dispute between the parties has arisen from an agreement for sale and purchase of a house in Serangoon Garden signed on September 1, 1979. It was not till 21 months later that a caveat was lodged on June 11, 1981. Then, from this date to the date of the hearing of this application on May 7, 1982, no action has been commenced by the defendant against the plaintiff in respect of the dispute, a lapse of 11 months. In these circumstances, having regard to the foregoing, on the ground of delay alone, the caveat must be removed forthwith.

My decision is entirely on the caveat. There is nothing to prevent the defendant from commencing action against the plaintiff on the alleged claim of breach of trust.

I made an Order in Terms of the Originating Summons with costs to the plaintiff. There was liberty to apply.