Abdul Malek Ahmad JCA:

At the hearing of the appeal before us, we were confronted with three main issues. The first concerned the question of limitation which, if we agreed with the views of learned Counsel for the respondent, would eliminate the necessity of dealing with the other two problems.

The second was as regards the proper juridical basis on which a point of law ought to be admitted because the parties had proceeded in the Court below upon an erroneous admission of the law which did not bind us. The third was the subject matter of the appeal itself namely whether the respondent had acted indiscriminately towards Ahmad Tajudin bin Haji Ishak, on behalf of himself and for 53 others holding the post of security assistants time scale, salary scale grade C-11 and conferred the powers of auxiliary police constables (who for the purposes of this judgment shall hereinafter be collectively referred to as 'the appellant').

By an originating summons dated 10 November 1992, the appellant had asked:

(a) for a declaration that the respondent had acted indiscriminately towards the appellant as regards the salary scale grade C-11 for the security assistants conferred with the powers of auxiliary police constables;

(b) for a declaration that the appellant had the right to be conferred the powers of auxiliary police sergeants effective from l May 1982;

(c) a consequential order directing the respondent to cease acting indiscriminately for the particular salary scale and that the appellant be given the same standing as the auxiliary police sergeants and enjoy the benefits enjoyed by other, security assistants in salary scale grade C-11 who had been conferred the powers of auxiliary police sergeants;

(d) a consequential order directing the respondent to pay the appellant a special allowance payable to security assistants in salary scale C-11 conferred the powers of auxiliary police sergeants at RM40 a month effective from 1 May 1982 or from a date fixed by the Court;

(e) a consequential order directing the respondent to pay the appellant the difference of RM53 a month from l September 1991 which is the difference of the housing rent allowance of RM138 a month payable to security assistants in salary scale grade C-11 conferred the powers of auxiliary police sergeants as compared to the allowance of RM85 a month for the same category paid to the appellant;

(f) costs;

(g) interest; and

(h) any other order or relief deemed fit and appropriate by the Court.

It must be mentioned here that the relevant effective date should have been 11 May 1982 and not l May 1992 as wrongly stated in the originating summons.

We shall start by examining whether the matter is time-barred in the first place as pointed out by learned Counsel for the respondent. According to learned Counsel for the appellant, there had been negotiations between the parties in this action since 1982 the result of which only came to their knowledge on 5 September 1990 which, in his view, would be the relevant date time would begin to run for limitation purposes.

Learned Counsel for the respondent, however, contend that the time would begin on 11 May 1982 for the following reasons:

a) that was the date the other 46 security assistants were conferred the powers of auxiliary police sergeants;

b) there was never any negotiations between the parties as a alleged and therefore no promise by the respondent to negotiate on the conferment of the powers of auxiliary police sergeants citing the cases of Ng Moh V. Tan Bok Kim & Anor [1968] and Nasri V. Mesah [1970] as cases on point; c) the respondent's letter dated 5 September 1990 was only in relation to special allowances;

and accordingly in view of the 36-month period stated in s. 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (hereinafter 'the Act') , the appellant's cause of action against the respondent would have lapsed on 10 May 1985. Since the matter was filed only on 10 November 1992, she submitted that th