Zulkefli Makinudin J:

[1] This is an application by way of notice of motion on the part of the third, fourth and fifth defendants (hereinafter referred to as "the defendants") to disqualify Messrs Sri Dev & Naila from representing the third party in this action (encl 61).

[2] As regards the court's jurisdiction I am of the view that this court has an inherent jurisdiction to hear such an application to disqualify a solicitor from acting for a particular party in the interest of justice. (See the case of Lee Kam Sun v. Ho Sau Lin & Anor, [1999] 4 MLJ 509).

The Grounds For The Application

[3] It is not disputed that Mr Sri Dev Nair of Messrs Sri Dev & Naila acts as counsel for the plaintiffs in the present case and for the plaintiffs in another related case in the Kuala Lumpur High court suit D6-22-553-2001 involving parties that are almost the same as in the present case. The cause of action of the parties in these two related cases is focussed on the issue of a dispute over the rights of ownership of the Hollywood trade mark under a Distribution Agreement entered into by the parties on 6 July 2000.

[4] It is also not disputed that the third party Uma Devi d/o Balakrishnan whilst being a director of the second defendant in the present suit had affirmed an affidavit on behalf of the second defendant's application for an injunction against the plaintiffs in the said suit D6-22-553-2001. The third party has, in the present suit in support of the plaintiffs' application for an interim injunction (encl 2) alleged that the second defendant's application for an injunction in the said suit No D6-22-553-2001 was "spurious" despite having affirmed the affidavit supporting the second defendant's application.

[5] It is the contention of the defendants that Messrs Sri Dev & Naila cannot act for the third party when Mr Sri Dev Nair is acting for the plaintiffs in another related suit ("the first conflict"). It is also the contention of the defendants that Messrs Sri Dev & Naila cannot act for the third party knowing that the third party has given conflicting evidence on oath in this suit and in suit D6-22-553-2001 ("the second conflict").

The First Conflict

[6] It is my view that in any suit, the plaintiff and third party will be in conflicting positions. Order 16 r 4(4) of the Rules of High 1980 ("RHC 1980") allows the court to give such directions to the third party to defend the suit whether alone or jointly with any defendant. The necessary consequence of O 16 r 4(4) of RHC 1980 is that the third party can, at the trial, cross-examine the plaintiffs and seek discovery against and interrogate the plaintiffs. In essence, the plaintiffs and the third party are on "opposing" sides much the same way as the plaintiffs and the defendants are on opposing sides. The position that the plaintiffs and the third party are on "opposing" sides, so to speak, is further evidenced by the fact that the third party notice (encl 34) issued in this case is in accordance with Form 22 of RHC 1980 which states that the third party is allowed to dispute the plaintiffs' claim against the defendants; or dispute the defendants' claim against the third party. Having established that the plaintiffs and the third party are on opposing sides, the issue that has to be determined by this court is whether Mr Sri Dev Nair can continue to act for the third party when he also acts as counsel for the plaintiff, albeit it, in a different but related suit D6-22-553-2001.

The Second Conflict

[7] The third party in the present suit has in a statutory declaration annexed to the affidavit in support of the plaintiffs' application for an interim injunction as in encl 2 stated as follows:

Angela in the meanwhile had been to see Ms HH Goh & Company, solicitors who commenced KLHC Civil Suit No:D6-22-553-201 on 5 April 2001 against Kayla and Kayla Group and also applied for an ex parte injunction on the same day to restrain from broadcasting the informecials on FTF and GCS II based on all