Ahmad Fairuz CJ:

[1] Semasa menulis alasan-alasan penghakiman ini, saya berpeluang membaca draf-draf penghakiman YAA Presiden Mahkamah Rayuan, YAA Hakim Besar Sabah & Sarawak dan YA Dato' Augustine Paul HMR. Seperti ditegaskan oleh YA Dato' Augustine Paul di dalam drafnya itu, rayuan-rayuan jenayah di hadapan mahkamah ini melibatkan isu sama ada anggapan pemilikan di bawah s 37(d) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (Akta itu) boleh disifatkan sebagai kesaksian (evidence) pemilikan di bawah s 37(da). mahkamah ini telah menyelesaikan isu itu dengan secara negatif iaitu anggapan-anggapan itu tidak boleh disifatkan sebagai kesaksian pemilikan. Ini ketara dari kes Muhammed bin Hassan v. PP, [1998] 2 MLJ 273 (kes Muhammed Hassan) yang memutuskan isu itu seperti berikut (di ms 189-191):

In deciding this issue, it is necessary, first and foremost, to bear in mind that both sub-section (d) and (da) of s 37 of the Act, being penal provisions, must be construed, and must not be extended beyond their clear meaning.

The wordings of sub-section (d) and (da) of s 37 are clear and unequivocal. That being so, their meanings must be determined from the language employed and the two sub-sections must be taken to mean exactly what they respectively say.

In our view, there is a clear undeniable distinction between the word 'deemed' used in s 37(d) and the word 'found' employed in s 37 (da) of the Act. The 'deemed' state of affairs in s 37(d) (ie deemed possession and deemed knowledge) is by operation of law and there is no necessity to prove how that particular state of affairs is arrived at. There need only to be established the basic or primary facts necessary to give rise to that state of affairs, ie the finding of custody or control. Such presumptions as under s 37(d) (and, for that matter, the one under s 37(da)) are sometimes described as 'compelling presumptions' in that upon proof of certain facts by a party (in our present case, proof of custody or control in s 37(d) by the prosecution), the court must in law draw a presumption in its favour (ie presumptions of possession and knowledge) unless the other party proves the contrary. Such a presumption has the compelling force of law. It is a deduction which the law requires the trial court to make. On the other hand, the word 'found' in the opening phrase of s 37(da) connotes a finding after a trial by the court.

Furthermore, the basic or primary facts needed to raise 'deemed' possession and 'deemed' knowledge under s 37(d) of the Act and those required to raise 'presumed trafficking' under s 37(da) are different. To come to the presumptions of possession and knowledge under s 37(d), one need only to arrive at a finding of having had 'in custody or under control anything whatsoever containing' the drug (as opposed to the drug itself) whereas to arrive at the presumption of 'trafficking' under s 37(da), a finding of being 'in possession' of the drug is necessary (in addition of course, to proof of the relevant minimum quantity specified). In view of the above differences, it would be unduly harsh and oppressive to construe the automatic application of presumption upon presumption as contended by the learned deputy public prosecutor a construction that ought to be adopted only if, upon the wordings of the two sub-sections such an intention of the Parliament is clear, which, in our opinion, is not.

In our view, to constitute 'possession' under s 37(da) of the Act, so as to be capable of forming one of the ingredients thereunder thereby giving rise to the presumption of trafficking, there must be an express affirmative finding (as opposed to legal presumption) of possession as understood in criminal law, based on evidence.

[2] Timbalan Pendakwa Raya menghujjahkan bahawa mahkamah ini di dalam kes Muhammed Hassan telah tersilap kerana menggunapakai kaedah pentafsiran ketat (strict construction rule) dengan menganggap s 37 Akta itu adalah peruntukan penal. Mengikut Timbalan Pendakwa Raya, peruntukan s 37