The court clarified requirements for bill taxation under the Law Profession Act, emphasizing that consent must be mutual and that failure in bill delivery precludes taxation.

[1] The respondent obtained a High Court Order, inter alia, for the bills of costs between him and the appellants to be taxed on a "solicitor and client" basis. The appellants appealed against the order but was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, hence the present appeal before us.

[2] The facts can best be laid down by setting out the chronology of events leading to the present appeal. They are as follows:

In 2005, the respondent was appointed by Patent View Development Sdn Bhd ("Patent View") and the appellants in their personal capacities to act for them in various legal proceedings.

On 22 March 2011, the appellants terminated the services of the respondent.

On 4 April 2011, the appellants' solicitors, Messrs Culaz & Associates ("Messrs Culaz") informed the respondent that they had instructions to represent Patent View and the appellants. Messrs Culaz requested, inter alia, for a list of pending matters, final account of fees paid and the balance payable.

On 5 April 2011, the respondent stated his objection to any matter that was on record being handled by him or any other solicitor until the fees due and owed to him were settled in full.

On 16 March 2012, the respondent delivered pro-forma invoices amounting to RM4,911,553.00 to Patent View and the appellants.

On 2 April 2012, the appellants through Messrs Culaz disputed both the principal and quantum charged and inquired whether the respondent consented to the taxation of the bills under s 126(3) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ("the LPA ").

On 22 September 2016, the respondent prepared a detailed bill of costs for taxation and effected service on the appellants.

On 21 November 2016, the respondent filed an Originating Summons, which was later amended, inter alia, for payment of the legal fees and order for taxation.

On 19 June 2017, the High Court allowed the amended Originating Summons.

On 30 May 2018, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal against the High Court Order.

On 22 April 2019 this Court granted the appellants leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal decision on the following questions of law:

Question 1

Whether the phrase "a bill of costs delivered by an advocate and solicitor" in s 126(1) of the LPA is to be interpreted as referring to a bill of costs that contains detailed items within the meaning of s 121(1) of the and is thereby ready for taxation?

Question 2

Whether the High Court can grant an Order for the Taxation of a Solicitors Bill of Costs under s 126(1) of the LPA after the expiry of the one year from the delivery of the Bill of Costs in the light of s 128(2) of the ?

Question 3

Whether the phrase "consent to taxation of a solicitor's bill" in s 126(3) of the LPA is to be interpreted as requiring an agreement between the client and the solicitor that the solicitor's bill be taxed?

Question 4

Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to grant an order for taxation under s 126(3) of the LPA if the parties have consented to the taxation of bill of costs?

Question 5

Whether the limitation period of six years under s 6(1 )(a) of the Limitation Act 1953 ("the LA ") applies to any action by an advocate and solicitor to recover costs due for any business done by him under the LPA ?

Question 6

If yes, whether the limitation period of six years starts from the date the business by the advocate and solicitor is completed?

[3] Having heard arguments by both sides, both written and oral, we unanimously allowed the appellants' appeal on the following broad grounds. The central issue in this appeal was whether or not the letter dated 2 April 2012 amounted to a consent by the appellants as found by both courts below. We found the findings to be unsupported by the evidence as the lette