Courts will not adjudicate on doctrinal disputes within religious organizations, recognizing the non-justiciable nature of such issues in defamation claims.

[1] The Claimant in these proceedings has the title "His Holiness Sant Baba Jeet Singh Ji Maharaj". As I understand it, he lives in India and has never been to England. I understand that he does not speak much English and the proposal is that he should give evidence via video link and through an interpreter.

[2] There has been no jurisdictional challenge, no doubt because the words complained of were published here, in the Sikh Times dated the 23 August 2007.

[3] The first defendant was the publisher and the second defendant the author of the article in question, which was published on p 15 of that issue under the heading, "Cult divides Sikh congregation in High Wycombe". It is said to be damaging to the Claimant's reputation in this jurisdiction and particularly among the various Sikh communities in this country. I understand that there are several hundred thousand followers of the religion here, of whom it is likely that many will know of the Claimant and of the controversy that forms the subject matter of this article.

[4] Now, on what is intended to be the first day of the trial, a preliminary issue has to be resolved on the second defendant's application to stay the claim, either wholly or in part, as being non-justiciable. (The application notice makes reference to striking out the pleading but it matters not substantively.)

[5] That issue was pleaded in the defense on 16 November 2007 and is founded on the well-known principle of English law to the effect that the courts will not attempt to rule upon doctrinal issues or intervene in the regulation or governance of religious groups. That is partly because the courts are secular and stand back from religious issues while according respect to the rights of those who are adherents or worshippers in any such grouping. It is also partly because such disputes as arise between the followers of any given religious faith are often likely to involve doctrines or beliefs which do not readily lend themselves to the sort of resolution which is the normal function of a judicial tribunal. They may involve questions of faith or doctrinal opinion which cannot be finally determined by the methodology regularly brought to bear on conflicts of factual and expert evidence. Thus it can be seen to be partly a matter of a self-denying ordinance, applied as a matter of public policy, and partly a question of simply recognizing the natural and inevitable limitations upon the judicial function.

[6] It is obviously desirable that any such challenge should be made at an early stage in the litigation concerned. Here the issue could have been raised no doubt at any time in the last two and a half years but, whenever it is made, the court will need to examine the issues as they stand in the light of the parties' respective pleaded cases. It must be a specific inquiry to be made on the facts. It is not simply a question of general impression. In particular, it seems that the judge will need to identify all the issues that the pleadings throw up for resolution and to decide whether they fall within the doctrine of judicial abstention to which I have referred. If that turns out to be the case, in so far as there may be questions of pure fact which taken by themselves could readily be determined by the court in the usual way, it will be necessary to decide whether that process should go ahead despite the exclusion of primary doctrinal or other religious issues. To go ahead in such circumstances may be disproportionate or distort the true extent of the parties' conflict. Here,