Richard Talalla J:

The appellant was convicted in the Magistrates Court of an offence punishable under s. 20(1)(a) of the Drug Dependants (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983 and sentenced to 10 months imprisonment with effect from 20 October 1991. Being dissatisfied with the conviction and sentence he appealed to this Court against the same. The notice of appeal was signed by the appellant. Also thereon was a signature in the name of a firms of advocates and solicitors (the solicitors) expressing themselves to the Counsel for the appellant. The address given in the notice of appeal was the address of the solicitors. The Court unilaterally set the appeal down for hearing on 29 September 1992 and by letter dated 1 September 1992 gave notice of that hearing to the learned Deputy Public Prosecutor (the Deputy) and the solicitors. When on the hearing date the appeal was called on, the Deputy appeared but not Counsel for the appellant nor was the appellant present. Because the notice of the hearing was considered by the Court to be somewhat short, and bearing in mind that the hearing date was unilaterally fixed, the Court adjourned the hearing to 27 October 1992. By letter dated 22 October 1992 addressed to the Senior Assistant Registrar (the SAR), the solicitors referred to the impending hearing on 27 October 1992 and stated that on 20 October 1992 the appellant had gone to their office and taken away the appeal record from them, saying that he wished to engage a new lawyer to conduct his appeal. Therefore, said the solicitors in the said letter, they were no more representing the appellant and they requested to be excused from attending the hearing on 27 October 1992. At my direction, the SAR by way of reply to the said letter telephoned the office of the solicitors and told a clerk there, all the lawyers being unable to speak then, that Counsel was required to appear in Court on 27 October 1992. When the appeal came on for hearing on 27 October 1992 again Counsel for the appellant and the appellant were absent. In consequence the appeal was by order adjourned to 14 November 1992 for hearing of the same and for such order or orders against the appellant or Counsel for the appellant or both the appellant and Counsel for the appellant by reason of their failure to attend and appear at the hearing of the appeal, as might be appropriate inasmuch as the fair administration of justice might have been affected by such failure to attend. At the same time it was directed that the said order be served on the Secretary of the Bar Council and and Chairman of the Bar Committees, State of Johor and Federal Territory.

The SAR having extracted the said order duly served the same as directed as did he serve the said order on the appellant the solicitor.

When the appeal came on for hearing on 14 November 1992, a partner in the said firm appeared as Counsel and commendably accepted full and personal responsibility as and for Counsel at all material times representing the appellant in these proceedings. Counsel immediately thereafter intimated that no disrespect to the Court was at any time intended and apologised for any inconvenience caused to the Court.

There is only one issue and that is whether the failure of Counsel and the appellant to appear before the Court on 27 October 1992 resulting in the hearing having to be adjourned constituted a contempt of Court. In Rondel v. Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191, Lord Reid made repeated references to Counsel being an officer of the Court concerned in the administration of justice and having an overriding duty to the Court and the public. He also referred to that implicit trust between the Bench and the Bar which does so much to promote the smooth and speedy conduct of the administration. Lord Reid approved the statement of the Court in Swinfen v. Lord Chelmsford [1860] 5 H & amp; N 921 to the effect that the duty undertaken by an advocate is one in which the client, the Court and the public have