Lord Templeman:

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech prepared by my noble and learned friend, Lord Griffiths. I agree with it, and for the reasons given, I would allow these appeals.

Lord Bridge of Harwich:

My Lords,

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech of my noble and learned friend, Lord Griffiths. I agree with it and, for the reasons he gives, I would allow the appeal.

Lord Griffiths:

My Lords,

The respondent will be 36 years of age on 29 January 1993. The question before your Lordships is whether the law permits her to pursue a claim for damages against her adoptive father and stepbrother based upon allegations that she was sexually abused by the adoptive father between the ages of 2 and 14 and raped by her stepbrother when she was 12 and he was 17. It should be made clear that these allegations are denied by both the father and stepbrother who are the appellants before your Lordships. It would obviously be a matter of grave difficulty for any Court to determine where truth lies if this action was to proceed, for it would be investigating events that are alleged to have occurred in a period starting over 30 years ago and ending over 20 years ago. It is also to be observed that neither the father nor the stepbrother would appear to have the means to satisfy any significant award of damages.

A summary of the respondent's allegations and the history of this litigation are contained in the judgment of Bingham LJ and the trial Judge Potter J. I will not repeat them as a preface to my speech because I have come to the conclusion that this action became statute barred in January 1981 six years after the respondent reached her majority on 29 January 1975 and cannot therefore be allowed to proceed. My conclusion depends upon the construction of ss. 2, 11 and 28 of the Limitation Act 1980, but before turning to those sections it is I think helpful to consider the development of the law on limitation of liability since 1939.

The Limitation Act 1939 provided by s. 2 that actions founded on simple contract or tort should not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued; but by s. 21 of the Act it continued the special protection afforded to public authorities introduced by the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 which provided a 12 month limitation period in respect of actions brought against public authorities.

The vast majority of actions against public authorities were actions for personal injuries arising out of accidents and it was seen as unfair that plaintiffs injured by a public authority should have a far shorter time in which to commence a claim than if they had been injured by someone in the private sector. In January 1948 the Lord Chancellor appointed a committee chaired by Lord Justice Tucker to inquire into this question with the following terms of reference:

(1) whether the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893, as amended in its application to England and Wales by s. 21 of the Limitation Act 1939, and in its application to Scotland by s. 48 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, should be further amended or repealed;

(2) whether the three-year limit prescribed by s. 49 of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, s. 11 of the Transport Act 1947, and s. 12 of the Electricity Act 1947, for the bringing of certain actions against the authorities therein mentioned is satisfactory;

(3) whether any alteration should be made in the time limits prescribed by the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, and by ss. 2 and 3 of the Limitation Act 1939, for the bringing of certain actions in England and Wales; ...

The Tucker Committee presented their report to Parliament on 30 June 1949. In their report they made it clear that the evidence they had heard related almost entirely to actions for personal injuries. Insofar as actions for personal injuries were concerned they made the following recommendations:

(1) The Public Authorities Protec