Raja Azlan Shah Acting LP:

The reference before us is whether the Court has a discretion to order forfeiture of goods seized by any of the officers named in s. 14(1)(a) of the Price Control Act 1946(Revised 1973).The relevant provision of the said Act is s. 14:

(2) Where any price-controlled goods have been seized under subsection (1)(a), then -

(a) if, within thirty days of the seizure, no proceedings are instituted against any person for an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to those goods, the goods and accompanying appliances shall be restored to the person from whom they were seized if he can be found and, if not, shall be disposed of as may be directed by a Magistrate; or

(b) if, within thirty days of the seizure, proceedings are instituted against any person, the goods and accompanying appliances may be forfeited or otherwise disposed of in such manner as the Court may direct:

The respondent pleaded guilty to a charge under s. 22(1) of the Price Control Act 1946 (Revised 1973) for failing to affix tags on his goods i.e. RM20,000 worth of textiles.He was fined RM5,000 and the goods seized were forfeited under s. 14(2)(b) of the said Act. The learned President was of the view that he had a judicial discretion to forfeit the goods under the said subsection.

On appeal the learned Judge held that the Court had no discretionary power to order forfeiture. He noted that there is no separate provision for forfeiture or confiscation in the Price Control Act s. 22of which is silent in this respect. He contrasted the said Act with s. 26(1) of the Control of Supplies Act 1961 (Revised 1973),s. 14(1) of the Fisheries Act 1963, s. 92(4) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, s. 126 of the Customs Act 1967,s. 30(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance 1952, s. 426C(1) of the National Land Code and s. 74(1) of the Animals Ordinance 1953 in which he said there are special provisions for forfeiture and held that in the absence of any such express provision in the Price Control Act, the Court has no power to order forfeiture. He further said that the provision of the said Act regarding forfeiture is vague and he accordingly construed that in favour of the appellant. He referred to s. 407 of the Criminal Procedure Codewhich enacts that `the Court's power to order forfeiture is subject to any special provisions relating to forfeiture contained in the written law under which the conviction was had' and said that since the provisions of the Price Control Act are silent with regard to forfeiture except s. 14(2)(b) which merely makes `an oblique reference and not being comprehensive,' s. 407 of the Criminal Procedure Codeshould be relied on by the Court in the disposal of the goods, the subject-matter of the present appeal.

We were told that the goods had since been returned to the respondent.

The first task of the Court is to find out the intention of Parliament and the words of a statute speak the intention of Parliament. `And in so doing it must bear in mind that its function is jus dicere, not jus dare:the words of a statute must not be overruled by the Judges, but reform of the law must be left in the hands of Parliament' (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., pp. 1, 2).

The Price Control Act was passed with the purpose of controlling the price of goods. It has discernible public policy for its object. It is unique in this respect and therefore the scope of its operation is clear. In order to discover the intention of Parliament it is therefore proper that the Court should read the Act as a whole, inform itself of the legal context of the said Act, including Acts in pari materiawhich may throw some light on its meaning, and of the factual context, such as the mischief to be remedied.

In order to ascertain the intention of Parliament, the learned Judge has referred to phrases which have been used in other statutes which have fundamentally the same social objectives. In our opinion, that is a safe guide as an extrinsi