Suffian LP (delivering the JUDGMENT of the Court):

On 19 April 1975 the appellant was convicted and sentenced by the Special President in Kuala Lumpur. He appealed and on 22 October 1975, he lost his appeal in the High Court. At that time he could nothave appealed further to this Court. The only way he could have brought this matter to this Court was by way of a reference under s. 66 of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964 , and he managed to get the High Court to so refer it, reserving for the decision of this Court a question of law of public interest which had arisen in the appeal. But by the time the reference came up before us ss 50(1) and 66 of the Act had been amended by Act A328 of 1976, so that when a High Court Judge has decided an appeal from the decision of a Special President - like the learned President here - the aggrieved party may appeal in the ordinary way of the Federal Court under the amended sub-section (1) of s. 50 , but the Judge may not make a reference under s. 66. This Court, being of opinion that it had no jurisdiction to do so, refused to consider the reference; whereupon the appellant filed notice of appeal and as he was out of time - through no fault of his - applied for leave to file the record of appeal out of time, which leave was granted.

When this matter came up again before this Court, the learned Deputy took a preliminary objection, arguing that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal as the appellant was convicted at a time when he could not have appealed beyond the High Court, and that the fact that we have given the appellant leave to file his appeal record out of time makes no difference.

Mr Jagjit Singh on the other hand contends that before the amendment there was one way by which this matter could have reached this Court - by way of reference - and that after the amendment another way - by way of appeal - and that it does not matter by which way this matter can reach this Court, and that the amendment clearly shows that the legislature does not intend to shut out the appellant altogether from resorting to this Court, and that therefore this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

We are of the opinion that we have no jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

"...it is perfectly settled that if the legislature forms a new procedure, that, instead of proceeding in this form, you should proceed in another and a different way, clearly there bygone transactions are to be sued for and enforced according to the new form of procedure. Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there is some good reason or other why they should not be."

On the other hand a statute dealing with rights has effect only for the future and is not to be construed retrospectively, it does not apply to proceedings begun before its commencement, it only affects proceedings begun after that, unless there is a clear indication to the contrary. This was so stated by Jessel MR in Re Joseph Suche & Co. Ltd. (1875) 1 Ch D 48, 50 in the following words:

It is a general rule that when the legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them."

Does a statute allowing a convicted person to appeal to a Superior Court deal with procedure or with rights?

No authority need be cited for the proposition that no Court has an inherent appellate jurisdiction and that a dissatisfied person may appeal if, and only if, statute so provides.

It is thus clear that a statute that allows a person to appeal to a Superior Court is not merely dealing with a matter of procedure but with rights.