1978 MarsdenLR 425
FEDERAL COURT, KUALA LUMPUR
SYARIKAT SENG LIAN TRADING – Appellant
Versus
ROXY (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No. 99 Of 1977]
Suffian LP (delivering the grounds of decision of the Court):
We allowed this appeal and now give our reasons.
Roxy (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. ("judgment creditor" and respondent before us) obtained judgment against PJ TV and Densun (M) Sdn. Bhd. ("judgment debtor"). The judgment creditor thought that Syarikat Seng Lian Trading (garnishee and appellant before us) owed money to the judgment debtor, so they served a notice garnishment on them, saying that all property to which the judgment debtor was entitled and which was or shall be under the control of the garnishee Syarikat was attached in its hands as garnishee.In due course the garnishee appeared in chambers before the Senior Assistant Registrar.The garnishee denied owing any money to the judgement debtor.The learned Senior Assistant Registrar ordered that the issue of indebtedness, if any, of the garnishee to the judgment debtor and the amount of the indebtedness be tried before her and that the garnishee produce all books and other relevant documents for the determination of this issue.Trial of this issue before the Senior Assistant Registrar in chambers occupied nine days between 8 January 1976, and 2 April 1976, at which the judgment creditor was represented by Counsel and the garnishee not.In the event the learned Senior Assistant Registrar found that the garnishee was indebted to the judgment debtor and after a further enquiry ordered that the garnishee pay the judgment creditor $74,676.46. That was on 28 April 1976.
The garnishee applied to the Judge to set aside the proceedings before the Senior Assistant Registrar and the order made by her.It said that the Rules of the Supreme Court had not been compiled with.The Judge dismissed the application.
The garnishee appealed to us.
It was said on the garnishee's behalf that the learned Senior Assistant Registrar had no jurisdiction to try the issue of liability of the garnishee, that she should have held that under the Rules of the Supreme Court she had only jurisdiction to settle issues by consent of parties, and once the issue had been settled the trial of the issue should have proceeded before a Judge so that the garnishee could have had the benefit of pleadings and a proper trial.
As the garnishee disputed liability, O. 45 r. 4 is relevant.It reads:
If the garnishee disputes his liability, the Court or a Judge may order that any issue or question necessary for determining his liability shall be tried or determined in any manner in which an issue in an action may be tried, or, with the consent of the parties, may dispose of the question between them in a summary manner.
In our judgment, here, as the garnishee disputed liability, the learned Senior Assistant Registrar had two alternative courses open to her: either
(a) order that the issue of the garnishee's liability be tried in a manner in which an issue in an action may be tried (because of the words italicized, this means in our opinion a trial in open Court before a Judge); or
(b)if the parties consented, dispose of the question between them in a summary manner, i.e., herself dispose of the question (this would be appropriate if the issue is simple and the amount involved is small).
The learned Senior Assistant Registrar did not adopt course (a). If she had done that, then the Judge who would eventually have tried the issue could pursuant to O. 34 r. 9 have directed that the issue be tried without pleadings, could have directed who should be plaintiff and who defendant, and the garnishee would have had the advantage of discovery, inspection, interrogatories and such like.
Instead the learned Senior Assistant Registrar adopted course (b). It was said on behalf of the judgment creditor before us that consent on the part of the garnishee could be express or implied, that the conduct of the garnishee before the Senior Assistant Registrar amounted to implied consent and that accordingly the Senior Assistant Registrar had jurisdiction to do what she did.
It is true th