JUDGMENTBY: SHANKAR J W

the applicant wife had a whirlwind courtship in early 1985 with H (the respondent husband). Its result was the conception of the infant I, who is the subject matter of the present application. Pregnancy was medically confirmed in May 1985. After an unsuccessful attempt to abort the child, the parties married on July 6, 1986. Thereafter they cohabited in the house of the husbands parents. After a few months, and in circumstances to be set out in detail hereafter, the marriage came under great strain. The wife returned to her mothers house. Attempts at reconciliation failed. There was a bitter quarrel on January 22, 1986, in the husbands parents house in which the parties hereto, their parents and other relatives were all participants. It must have seemed to all concerned that the breaking point had been reached. So the assistance of a lawyers clerk was obtained to put up a separation deed. It provided inter alia that the wife was not to receive any maintenance and that sole custody of the child to be born should be given to the husband. And it provided that on the expiration of two years from the date of the marriage, the parties should make a joint application for a divorce. A week later on February 6, 1986, a boy was born. One day later he found himself in the custody of his father. Shortly thereafter, W attempted with the help of her solicitor to regain custody of her new-born baby. He failed. So the present application was filed on February 20, 1986. It has been strenuously contested by H.

Both parties have filed lengthy affidavits. The husbands affidavit is supported by other affidavits from immediate members of his family and a friend. What all these affidavits add up to is that we have here a situation where the husband and wife are both under tremendous emotional strain. What is equally obvious is that the near relatives on either side are equally under stress. Their criticisms of each other are vehement and vociferous.

In this state of affairs, it may be as well if I stated right at the outset that washing dirty linen in public does not make it any cleaner. The identity of the parties should be of no interest to the public except to satisfy the cravings of morbid curiosity. I am firmly of the view that it will not serve the best interest of justice or the parties or the infant to have their names publicised. Consequently I hereby order that the names of the parties in this application and the name of the infant should only be designated by the letters of the alphabet assigned to each of them. I further order that the names of all the witnesses to these proceedings should not be published.

My powers to do so appear to be contained in section 15 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which provides that notwithstanding that the court is deemed to be an open and public court to which the public generally may have access, nevertheless the court has power to hear any matter in camera if it is satisfied that it is expedient in the interest of justice or propriety or for other sufficient reasons so to do, and further that the court may at any time order that no person shall publish the name, address or photograph of any witness involved in the proceedings or any evidence or any other thing likely to lead to the identification of these persons. Contravention of such an order is a criminal offence.

Where infants are involved, it would seem to be the usual practice to have the hearing in camera: See Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 and the commentary to O.33 r.4 of the Rules of the High Court (para 33/4/3 Supreme Court Practice 1985). Account should also be taken here of rule 99 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings Rules 1980 which precludes the inspection of documents filed in matrimonial proceedings by anyone other than the parties thereto, their solicitors and the Attorney General.

However, although I consider it desirable in the interest of justice that the identities of the parties involved in thi

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