2000 MarsdenLR 1028
MOHD NOOR ABDULLAH
PV DAS – Appellant
Versus
PENDAFTAR PERTUBUHAN MALAYSIA – Respondent
For the plaintiff - Tun Salleh Abbas; M/s Rugber Singh & Co
For the defendant - Amarjeet Singh SFC
The court emphasized the necessity for legitimate authority in recognizing party leaders under applicable law, while affirming its jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes related to party governance.
Headnote:The case concerns the leadership dispute within the Peoples Progressive Party and the legitimacy of office-bearers under the Societies Act 1966. The court examined claims made by factions and the Registrar's role in recognizing office-bearers. It was determined that the recognition of one faction as lawful was flawed. Key principles include the requirement of lawful authority and the court's jurisdiction over challenges to the Registrar's decisions. The court ruled that the Registrar failed to act fairly in recognizing the leadership. As a result, the plaintiff’s prayers concerning the legality of the decisions made were granted where applicable.
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| 1. dispute regarding party leadership among three factions. (Para 2) |
Mohd Noor Abdullah J:
Introduction
The Peoples Progressive Party, at the material time was fragmented into three factions, one faction was led by Dato' Mak Hon Kam, another by Dato' Kayveas and the other by P.V. Das. The episode started when Mak and his supporters claimed to be the office-bearers and members of PPP. This prompted S.I. Rajah and Das to institute civil action against Mak and his supporters in Kuala Lumpur High Court where an injunction restraining Mak and eight other defendants from holding out and claiming themselves to be the office-bearers of PPP, was applied and obtained.
Kayveas surfaced in the party hierarchy at the Extraordinary Delegates Conference held on 10 October 1993 when S.I. Rajah, the Acting President resigned his office and appointed Kayveas as President of PPP, which appointment was duly approved, supported and endorsed by the members present at the Extraordinary Delegates Conference.
However, Das and his supporters later withdrew their support and broke away from Kayveas.
Das, a party stalwart finally rose up to the No. 1 position in the party when at the Triannual Delegates Conference held at Segamat on 13 August 1995 which was called by his supporters, Das was elected as the President.
In the present action Das, the plaintiff is suing on his behalf and on behalf of the members of PPP. The defendant is a public officer appointed under the Societies Act 1966 whose powers, duties and functions include the settlement of disputes among the members or office-bearers of any society.
The plaintiff prays for four declarations, namely:
(1) that the defendant's recognition of Kayveas as President of PPP and those who support him as office-bearers, is unlawful and ultra vires the Societies Act and the PPP's Constitution;
(2) that the plaintiff and the office-bearers elected at the Triannual Delegates Conference held on 13 August 1995 are the lawful President and office-bearers of PPP; (3) that all approvals given by the defendant to Kayveas and his supporters regarding the change of address of the Headquarters of PPP, the formation of branches, the change of logo, the change of name of the Party in Bahasa Malaysia and the amendment of the Party's Constitution are all illegal, ultra vires the Societies Act and the PPP's constitution, and (4) the Headquarters of the registered office be at No. 15, 1st Floor, Persiaran Syed Putra, 50460 Kuala Lumpur, including damages and costs.
In the exercise of my discretion whether to grant or not to grant the reliefs prayed for I was guided by the principles of law enunciated by Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 which was adopted by the Supreme Court in Minister of Labour, Malaysia v. Lie Seng Fatt [1990] 2 MLJ 59, where Hashim Yeop Sani, CJ said:
The courts can only interfere with an act of executive authority if it be shown that the authority has contravened the law.
Secondly, the court is not a court of appeal in such matters.
Thirdly, the exercise of such discretion is governed by certain principles and so long as the exercise is within the four corners of these principles, the discretion is absolute and cannot be questioned in a court of law.
Lord Greene elaborated on those principles and they are that the exercise of the discretion must be a real exercise of the discretion and that the authority exercising the discretion must consider matters required to be considered and disregarded irrelevant collateral matters.
If the authority fails to observe these principles, the exercise of discretion cannot be said to be 'reasonable'. Lord Greene then summed up his guideline as follows:
The power of the court to interfere in each case is not as an appellate authority to override a decision of the local authority, but as a judicial authority which is concerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local authority