COURT OF APPEAL KUALA LUMPUR
CHEN HENG PING @ TIAN SEOW HOCK & 5 ORS – Appellant
Versus
INTRADAGANG MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: W-02-35-94]
[1] We dismissed this appeal against the summary judgment obtained by the respondent bank (the bank) against the appellants Our reasons now follow.
[2] On 6 September 1989 the bank agreed to provide a loan (the loan) of RM1.5 million to Campall Industries Sdn Bhd (Campall). On 15 October 1990 the bank agreed to provide a further loan by way of an overdraft facility (the facility) to the amount of RM1.6 million. In consideration of agreeing to provide the loan and the facility, the appellants executed one contract of guarantee in respect of the loan and another contract of guarantee in respect of the facility.
[3] Both contracts were in identical terms except as to the dates and the amount aforesaid. The liability of the appellants (the guarantors) were joint and several. The guarantors undertook to pay on demand all sums advanced to Campall together with the interest thereon.
[4] As at 1 March 1993 the bank had advanced to Campall under the loan and the facility the total sum of RM3,027,357.35. The interest on this principal sum as on that date was RM554,972.34. The cumulative amount was thus RM3,582,329.59 ("the debt").
[5] On 18 May 1993 the bank's solicitors sent each of the guarantors a letter by registered post demanding payment of the debt within 14 days None of the guarantors replied to this letter, let alone suggesting that they had any defence to the claim. On 7 September 1993 the process server of the bank's solicitors personally left at the last known address of the 3rd, 5th and 6th defendants at Batu Pahat another letter of demand dated 27 August 1993 for the said debt. These modes of service were expressly authorised by the said guarantors The second demand also went unheeded.
[6] These proceedings were filed on 4 April 1994. All the guarantors entered appearance. An amended defence was filed on 16 December 1993. It was followed shortly afterwards by the bank's application praying for summary judgment under O 14 or alternatively for the defence to be struck out under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High 1980.
[7] The bank's application was supported by the affidavit affirmed by its senior vice-president, who deposed to the facts hereinbefore set out. Both the guarantees were exhibited. Clause 3.19 read as follows:-
3.19 that a certificate by an officer of the bank as to the money and liabilities for the time being due or incurred from or by the borrower to the bank shall, in the absence of manifest error, be conclusive evidence in any legal proceedings against the guarantor or any of them;
[8] Also exhibited were the demand letter to Campall dated 30 November 1992, which set out full details of the moneys advanced, two certified statements of account dated 6 December 1993 showing the moneys and liabilities due to the bank on the loan, and on the facility, two demand letters and the process server's affidavit.
[9] When an application is made for summary judgment under O 14 supported by an affidavit which goes to show that there is no defence, the defendants must show cause why leave to defend must be given. This means that the defendants must provide answers on oath which constitute evidence that they have a defence which is fit to be tried. Denials in a defence do not constitute evidence. They are challenges to the other side to show proof. In the present case the guarantors do not appear to have appreciated this Their affidavits merely relied on the defence they pleaded, which consists of bare denials and points of law which they could not sustain.
[10] At the hearing in the Court below the first line of argument they raised was that before the bank could proceed against the guarantors it had first to establish the liability of Campall. This did not merit contention because cl 3.21 of each guarantee specifically provided that the bank was entitled to pursue the guarantors without first availing itself of its legal remedies against Campall.
[11] The second line of argument was that the certifica
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