[4] The workers from both sections were not given a paid day-off the following day. The company contended that the employees worked only 15 hours on the dates in question and were therefore not entitled to the benefit under art 26(4). The Penang & Seberang Prai Textile & Garment Industry Employees' Union (the union) representing the company's employees, on the other hand contended that the one-hour lunch break should be included in the calculation of the hours worked and therefore the employees had worked 16 hours to entitle them to the benefit of art 26(4).

[7] In a complaint of non-compliance with any term of a collective agreement or award under s 56 of the Industrial Relations Act, the Industrial Court should, as a general rule, look at the terms of the contract by confining itself to within the four walls of the collective agreement or award and decide whether the term has or has not been complied with. It is a purely enforcement function. It should not embark on an expedition to examine the provisions of the Employment Act in order to determine the meaning of the term complained of unless there is a specific reference to it because to do so would invoke the interpretative function of the Court under s 33 of the Industrial Relations Act which is an entirely different exercise from the one under s 56. It is important to recognise the difference between these two functions of the Court because failure to comply with an order under s 56 is an offence with penal provisions whereas there are no such consequences in respect of a matter dealt with under s 33. It is also important to separate the two functions in order to determine which particular jurisdiction the Industrial Court is exercising in any particular case. It may well be that in a dispute such as in the present case there should have been two separate applications to the Court, the first under s 33 to invite the Court to exercise its interpretative function and if there is still non-compliance, a second application for enforcement under s 56.