Equitable defences of acquiescence and estoppel may not prevent enforcement of specific performance in mutual covenant breaches.

iv. Waiver of breaches in any single instance of the covenants must not be construed so as to render the whole object of the covenant to be at an end. The fact that some homeowners have breached a term of the covenants and there is evidence of waiver of such breach do not have the effect of releasing other covenantors from any restrictive covenant of the same kind. In this regard, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of James LJ in German v. Chapman (supra) which states that:

"If there is a general scheme for the benefit of a great number of persons, and then, either by permission or acquiescence, or by a long chain of things, the property has been either entirely or so substantially changed as that the whole character of the place or neighbourhood has been altered so that the whole object for which the covenant was originally entered into must be considered to be at an end, then the covenantee is not allowed to come into the court for the purpose merely of harassing and annoying some particular man, where the court could see he was not doing it bona fide for the purpose of effecting the object for which the covenant was originally entered into. That is very different from the case we have before us, where the plaintiff says that in one particular spot far away from this place, and not interfering at all with the general scheme, he has, under particular circumstances, allowed a waiver of the covenant. I think it would be a monstrous thing to say that nobody could do an act of kindness, or that any vendor of an estate who had taken covenants of this kind from several persons could not do an act of kindness, or from any motive whatever relax in any single instance any of these covenants, without destroying the whole effect of the stipulations which other people had entered into with him. For instance, in this very case application was made to the plaintiff for a waiver. It would be monstrous to suppose, if he had acceded to that application, that therefore he was, by the mere act of kindness to the defendants themselves, destroying the whole benefit of the covenants as to all the rest of the estate. It appears to me it is impossible to apply the principles."

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