The privilege of solicitor-client communications belongs to the client and any breach is actionable, allowing for injunctions against unauthorized disclosures.

[1] This appeal deals with one but an important issue, that is, the scope of solicitor-client professional privilege as stipulated in s 126 and s 128 of the Evidence Act 1950 ('s 126' and 's 128' respectively).

[2] On 11 October 2016, this court granted leave to appeal on the following questions:

i. Whether a breach of s 126 of the Evidence Act 1950 on legal professional privilege by a solicitor gives rise to a cause of action against him by the client to obtain an injunction to restrain any disclosure of confidential information by him or whether, as stated by the court of Appeal, the client is confined to a complaint to the Advocates and Solicitors Disciplinary Board for breach of solicitor-client privilege?

ii. Whether a solicitor sued in his personal capacity for a debt could rely on confidential information reposed in him in his capacity as solicitor as a defence to the debt?

iii. Whether for the purposes of an action in court for breach of solicitor/client privilege, it is sufficient for the client to plead the breach without disclosing the contents of the privileged document?

iv. Whether s 126 by the use of the words 'unless with the client's express consent' rejects the concept of an implied waiver at common law?

[3] In this judgment unless otherwise stated, the appellant is referred to as the plaintiff while the two respondents as the defendants collectively or the 1st and 2nd defendants respectively.

[4] The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants who were sued as partners in the legal firm of Messrs TC Yeoh & Co ('the legal firm') alleging breach of their responsibility as solicitors under s 126. The High court decided in favour of the plaintiff but the court of Appeal reversed that decision. Hence, this appeal before this court.

[5] We heard the appeal on 12 July 2017 and 30 August 2017 and reserved our judgment. This is the unanimous Judgment of the court.

Background Facts

[6] The plaintiff was a shareholder of a company, Pan Palace Holdings Sdn Bhd, the registered owner of a piece of land situated at Sungai Dua, Penang ('the said Land'). The plaintiff wanted to develop the said Land. A company, Bukit Gambier Land Sdn Bhd ('Bukit Gambier') whose shareholders were Chow Yu Teck ('Chow'), Lim Kim Huat ('Lim') and Cheong Ho Kuan ('Cheong') agreed to undertake the development by way of a joint venture. The development project was known as Pan Palace Plaza.

[7] In order to ensure that he would not lose the said Land in case Bukit Gambier failed to carry out the development, the plaintiff was advised by the 1st defendant to get the shareholders of Bukit Gambier execute three Trust Deeds ('the Trust Deeds') with the plaintiff as the beneficiary. The advice was followed and the legal firm prepared the documents and had them duly executed. Legal fee in the preparation was charged to the plaintiff.

[8] It was agreed between the plaintiff and the legal firm that upon the successful completion of the development, the Trust Deeds would be destroyed.

[9] Bukit Gambier successfully developed the said Land and the plaintiff assumed that all copies of the Trust Deeds were destroyed.

[10] The defendants purchased one unit of shop-house in Pan Palace Plaza at the purchase price of RM605,000.00 ('the purchase price'). The defendants financed it by way of 80% bank loan and the balance of RM121,000.00 ('the said sum') was payable by them.

[11] Apart from preparing the Trust Deeds, the legal firm had done other legal works for the plaintiff and the total legal fees came up to RM183,050.00.

[12] The defendants did not pay the said sum. Bukit Gambier therefore commenced an action in the Sessions court in Georgetown, Penang to recover the said sum.

[13] The defendants disputed the claim and also applied f