Lim Beng Choon J:

In the present case Counsel for the defendants proposed to raise a preliminary question of law for my determination pursuant to O. 33 r. 2 of the Rules of High Court ("RHC") at the close of the case for the plaintiffs. The question posed by him was this: Are the plaintiffs entitled to seek the relief asked for in their statement of claim based on their own pleadings?

The facts relied by him in support of his application are primarily these:

1. As the 1st plaintiff is a bankrupt and not holding an official post in the PPP he therefore has no right to ask for the reliefs sought. 2. In any event based on their own pleadings both the plaintiffs are not entitled in law to pray for and to obtain the reliefs as set out in their statement of claim.

Counsel suggested that the criterion for the Court to consider whether a preliminary question could be raised for consideration under 0. 33 r. 2 is twofold viz:

(i) the determination of the preliminary point would save time; and (ii) it would also save on costs.

He went on to say that he raised the preliminary question only at the close of the plaintiff's case (and I quote his words) "because the facts relied upon are revealed only after the trial has commenced. There is no way that the defendants can envisage the evidence the plaintiffs would adduce. At the close of the plaintiffs' case we are in a better position to make this application." He further submitted that even if the Court was to look at the plaintiffs' case at its highest he would still submit that in law the plaintiffs were not entitled to the reliefs asked for by them. He then rounded up his submission by conceding that an application under O. 33 r. 2 had a limited scope from the applicant's point of view, since in such a case the matters that could be relied upon by the learned Counsel in support of his submission were the matters averred by the plaintiffs in their own pleadings and the law. On the other hand, so said Counsel, should he raise the issue of no case for the defendants to answer instead of raising a preliminary point for adjudicating then the learned Counsel could rely on, inter alia, the evidence adduced and the credibility of the witnesses to support his submission.

The submission of the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs may be summarised as follows:

The issue of law that Counsel for the defendants has raised is not an issue of law in that the statement of claim (filed on 26 August 1989) raises matters based on antecendent events which took place in 1988. At that point of time the 1st plaintiff was not a bankrupt and the reliefs sought are basically based on a declaration that all the defendants at that time did not have the legitimate standing in the PPP to hold the posts as office bearers of the said Party. The learned Counsel particularly pointed out to the Court that the action and conduct of the 10th defendant as can be culled from the statement of claim and the evidence adduced so far had at the material time acted ultra vires the PPP Constitution. Furthermore the 1st plaintiff's status as a bankrupt is a procedural matter. By this I gather from the whole of learned Counsel's submission that what he meant is that the bankruptcy of the 1st plaintiff should not and could not deter the Court from granting the reliefs sought for by the two plaintiffs one of whom is not a bankrupt. The question of the 1st plaintiff's bankruptcy would be relevant only when he sought to implement or execute the Court's judgment. If at the implementation or execution stage the 1st plaintiff has not cleared his bankruptcy then it is for the Registrar of Societies or any members of PPP to take action.

Counsel for the plaintiffs then went on to assert that at an interlocutory hearing when Counsel for the defendants raised the bankruptcy issue, Counsel for the plaintiffs intimated to the Court that the 1st plaintiff would obtain sanction from the Official Assignee to proceed with the action. Subseq