1991 MarsdenLR 187
HIGH COURT (SINGAPORE)
THEAN, J
BANK OF CHINA
versus
ASIAWEEK LTD
SUIT NO 1206 OF 1989
Decided On : 01-30-91
VK Rajah for the plaintiff.
Imran H Khwaja for the defendant.
Solicitors: Rajah & Tann; Tan Rajah & Cheah.
Thean J
The plaintiff is a bank incorporated in the People's Republic of China and carries on banking business in Hong Kong, Singapore and elsewhere. The defendant is a publisher of, among other things, a magazine in the Chinese language known as Yazhou Zhoukan (which is the Chinese edition of Asiaweek). The magazine is circulated and read in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere. In the edition dated 18 June 1989 of Yazhou Zhoukan, which was published prior to that date, there appeared on p 22 thereof a paragraph, which as translated into English reads:
As Singapore is highly sensitive to any forms of opposition, the Chinese there did not stir up waves of protests against Beijing. However, as a protest against the atrocity of Beijing, they made a run on the Bank of China Singapore Branch which is directly under Beijing. The deputy general manager of the bank, Min You Chi, told Asiaweek: 'In the light of what has happened, the feeling of depositors is understandable.' Up to last Thursday, a total of about US$75m was withdrawn, leaving the bank no alternative but to suspend business temporarily. (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiff complained that the words contained in that paragraph, and in particular the italicized words, were defamatory of the plaintiff and demanded that the defendant should immediately publish a complete retraction of the words complained of and an apology on terms to be approved by the plaintiff. Upon the defendant's refusal to comply with such demand, the plaintiff on 24 June took out a writ against the defendant claiming damages for libel.
There followed correspondence between the solicitors for the defendant and the plaintiff respectively with a view to an amicable settlement; unfortunately, the proposals made and discussed between them did not lead to fruition. The suit accordingly proceeded. The plaintiff delivered the statement of claim on 14 July 1989 and the defendant delivered the defence on 31 July 1989. On 1 August 1989, the defendant filed an affidavit affirmed by its director and editor-in-chief, Michael O'Neill, on 26 July 1989, which was purported to be filed pursuant to s 7 of the Defamation Act (Cap 75, 1985 Ed) ('the Act'). I shall have occasion to refer to the pleadings and this affidavit in greater detail in a moment.
On 16 August 1989, the plaintiff took a bold step by applying by Summons-in-Chambers No 4767 of 1989 for an order under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court that the defence be struck out and the plaintiff be at liberty to enter judgment against the defendant for damages to be assessed and costs. The application was heard before the senior assistant registrar who allowed the application; he struck out the defence and gave leave to the plaintiff to enter interlocutory judgment. Interlocutory judgment was subsequently entered. Against that decision, this appeal was brought. At the conclusion of the hearing, I found myself in entire agreement with the learned senior assistant registrar and dismissed the appeal with costs. I now give my reasons.
Striking out the whole of a defence to a claim for libel is an extraordinary step and is only allowed in a plain and obvious case. In Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association & Ors [1970] 1 WLR 688; [1970] 1 All ER 1094, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants for libel in respect of an article published in the British Medical Journal. The defendants applied to strike out the statement of claim. The application was dismissed by the master and, on appeal, by Milmo J. On further appeal, the Court of Appeal, by a majority, dismissed it. Lord Pearson after referring to O 18 r 19 of the English Rules of Supreme Court said, at pp 695–696:
Over a long period of years it has been firmly established by many authorities that the power to strike out a statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action is a summary power which shoul