Recusal applications must establish actual or apparent bias with a high threshold of proof; failing to do so is an abuse of process.

[1] This is my judgment in respect of the defendant's application seeking for my recusal not on the grounds of any form of nexus directly or indirectly with the parties to the suit, but solely on the grounds that: (i) I have not allowed a winding-up petition against Comsa Properties Sdn Bhd (which has nexus to the plaintiff) for an indebted sum; and (ii) in that judgment I have concluded that the petition was oppressive and vindictive, tantamount to an abuse of process of court, and the application was filed with the view to paralyse Comsa Properties Sdn Bhd. The judgment has been published and reported as Malaysian Assurance Alliance Berhad v. Comsa Properties Sdn Bhd .

[2] When the matter came up for case management on 27 March 2012, the defendant's junior advocate, Mr Vijay Raj, informed the court that they have filed an application for my recusal, and wanted to stay proceedings until the hearing and disposal of an application which had not been sealed and served. I informed the defendant that in the present "fast track system", matters have to be justly, expeditiously and economically be dealt with. Pursuant to O 34 of the Rules of the High 1980, I suggested to them a recusal application is not necessary, but I have no objection for them to meet the Chief Judge of Malaya (CJM) or the managing judge, and request for the file to be transferred to another judge. I have also made it very clear that I would proceed to give further directions for trial, and in fact I have fixed a trial date notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had informed me that they have also filed an application to strike out the plaintiff's action for want of prosecution.

[3] The defendant chose not to seek directions from the CJM or managing judge but to file this recusal application. And also comments in the submission encl 42 as follows:

"15. The defendant has also expressed concern on trial dates being fixed after the current Recusal and Striking Out Applications were filed, and prior to commencement of Case Management preparations."

[4] Michael J Beloff QC, in his paper "Conflict of Interest-Recusal of Judges in the Commonwealth: The United Kingdom Dimension", says:

"For the practising advocate care must be taken not to lend himself manifestly abusive application."

And cites as follows:

"Para 6109(a) of the Bars Code of Conduct which makes barrister personally responsible for conduct and presentation of case, and he/ she must exercise personal judgment on substance and purpose of statements made the questions asked. In Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (1994) 6 Admin LR 348 Sir Thomas Bingham MR said: "Just as an inference of apparent bias is not to be lightly drawn, so a charge is not to be lightly made. That remains true even where, as here, any suggestion of actual bias is expressly disclaimed. Cases may unhappily arise in which evidence of bias or apparent bias so clear that an application for the discharge or removal of a judge is justified. But such an application is never justified simply by the instructions of the client. Counsel's duty to the court and to the wider interests of justice... requires that he should not lend himself to making such an application unless he is conscientiously satisfied that there is material upon which he can properly do so."

[See "Judges and Judicial Accountability", edited by Cyrus Das and K Chandra, p 83, Universal Law Publishing.]

[5] I will also in this judgment address the issue why an application for recusal should be made before the CJM or managing judge rather than unnecessarily to embarrass and/or burden the trial judge when there are other specific modes provided by statutes, and also the present practice of managing judge having control over the assignment of work to trial judges in the "fast track system" which may not be found in England and/or other jurisdiction.

[6] The parties have relied on the following cases: Mohame