This was an appeal to the judge in chambers in encl 17 against the decision of the senior assistant registrar ('the registrar') who had on 22 March 1996 dismissed the defendants' application in encl 8 to strike out the plaintiff's writ indorsed with the statement of claim in encl 2. The defendants relied solely on O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 ('the RHC') to advance their application in encl 8 and for convenience that rule is reproduced hereinunder:

(19) (l) The court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the indorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the indorsement, on the ground that—(a) It discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; …

The defendants did not file a supporting affidavit to back up their application in encl 8. The plaintiff filed two affidavits to challenge encl 8. One was in encl 10 that was affirmed on 9 June 1995 and filed on 15 June 1995. The other was in encl 15 that was affirmed on 6 February 1996 and filed on 9 February 1996. The issue that arose was whether in an application under O 18 r 19(l)(a) of the RHC this court must be compelled to take into account the plaintiff's affidavits in encls 10 and 15 or must this court be content to look at the statement of claim only? The answer seems to be found in O 18 r 19(2) of the RHC where it says that:

(19) (2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application under paragraph (1)(a).

It must be borne in mind that such a prohibition as clearly laid out in O 18 r 19(2) of the RHC is not meant to decorate the pages of the RHC but rather it should be vigorously applied and obeyed. The Rules Committee must have devised the rules for the expeditious despatch of litigation and, consequently, the courts must simply not stand idle but instead rise up to the occasion and enforce it accordingly. It is not surprising to note with awe that Mohamed Azmi FJ speaking for the Federal Court in New Straits Times (M) Bhd v Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 226 (FC), in strong terms construed O 18 r 19(1)(a) of the RHC in this way (at p 227):

It is therefore clear law that in an application to strike out pleadings under O 18 r 19(1)(a), no evidence shall be admissible, and the court must consider only the pleadings for the purpose of determining whether the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action or the statement of defence disclosed no defence. The test to be applied is whether on the face of the pleading, the court is prepared to say that the cause of action or the defence is obviously unsustainable (see A-G of the Duchy of Lancaster v L and NW Ry Co [1892] 3 Ch 274).

Syed Agil Barakbah J in Abu Bakar bin Haji Yusuf v Mohamed Hamzah bin Hanapiah & Anor [1978] 2 MLJ 78 in the same vein said at p 79:

Where the ground for striking out the statement of claim is that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, no affidavit is admissible. That is clear from the terms of the rule itself (per Chitty J in Republic of Peru v Peruvian Guano Co (1887) 36 Ch D 489).

In Karpal Singh & Anor v PP [1991] 2 MLJ 544 (SC), the then Supreme Court had to consider the question of 'whether the court has a general inherent power to protect its process from abuse to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice by striking out frivolous proceedings?', and Abdul Hamid Omar LP speaking for the Supreme Court in erudite terms had this to say at p 549:

The court must be careful that the decision is not in conflict with the intention of the legislature as indicated in statutory powers. The inherent power apparently cannot be invoked to override an express provision of law or when there is another remedy available. Where the legislature has provided a particular mode of action or has vested an authority with powers to act in a particular manner and has prescribed the conditions limiting the scope of such action, the co