Table of Content
1. balloting procedure for union representation under the act. (Para 1 , 7 , 10)
2. judicial willingness to uphold ministerial decisions. (Para 2 , 4 , 11)
3. threshold for judicial review restricts inquiry to procedural adherence. (Para 3 , 9)
4. importance of timely objections in administrative decisions. (Para 5 , 12)
5. appellant's challenge to ministerial decision based on section 9 of the ira. (Para 6)
6. judicial review limited to procedural issues, not merits. (Para 8)
7. the decision on recognition must follow established protocols. (Para 13)

[1] The appellant appeals against the decision of the learned High Court Judge who refused to quash the decision of the Minister giving recognition to the 2nd respondent, the Trade Union, pursuant to s 9 Industrial Relations Act 1967 (IRA 1967) on the grounds that the appellant had consented to a procedure relating to ballot by the employees concerned whom the appellant had approved. In essence, the learned trial judge took the position that the decision arising from the ballot procedure as well as the decision of the Minister ought not be impinged by entertaining the complaint by the appellant that those who balloted did not satisfy the requirement stated in the Act.

[2] This appeal came before us for hearing on 17 August 2016. We heard the appeal and dismissed it. In this case, the learned High Court Judge had written an articulate judgment on the facts and law and in consequence a further judgment is sheer waste of judicial time. It has been a long practice of the Court of Appeal to only write a judgment if the appeal is allowed in cases related to the original jurisdiction of the High Court and that too when an application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court is notified by the registry to the coram. In matters where the appeal is dismissed, a judgment will not be provided unless leave to appeal has been obtained from the Federal Court to appeal. That is to say, if the appeal is dismissed by the Court of Appeal, leave need to be obtained from the Federal Court for the Court of Appeal to give its grounds of judgment. If the appeal is from subordinate Court whether the appeal is allowed or dismissed, the Court of Appeal will not write a judgment unless the coram decides otherwise. This practice is not without reason as it will be impossible with the present strength of the appellate Court to write judgment for all appeals which are dismissed or in case where the appeal is allowed and no party is appealing on that. In addition, the lack of a judgment from the Court of Appeal will not prejudice the appellant to obtain leave in relevant appeals as there is already an existing judgment of the High Court to support the leave application.

[3] In the instant case, I have been informed by the Registry that the Federal Court has given leave for the following question, namely:

"Whether a trade union, by reason of an order of recognition, made under s 9 of the Act, may purport to represent a category of staff who did not participate nor vote in the secret ballot process provided for under the Act."

[4] I am now constrained to write the judgment, whilst my two brother judges had retired upon reaching the constitutional age. That is to say, this judgment has not been read and approved by them, though we had agreed that the learned trial judge was correct in law in all aspects.

[5] The amended Memorandum of Appeal reads as follows:

"1. The learned judge erred in law in failing to hold that the 1st respondent's decision to accord recognition to the 2nd respondent was contrary to the provisions of s 9(1) of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967 ("the Act") and thereby in excess of jurisdiction.

2. The learned judge erred in law in failing to hold the 1st respondent's decision to accord recognition was in excess of jurisdiction in that s 9(1) of the Act only entitles a union to represent either workmen in a managerial capacity or in an executive capacity and not in both capacities.

3. The l