KC Vohrah J:

The motion before me is to commit the 1st and 2nd defendants, partners of Syarikat Pal Bersaudara, to prison or contempt of Court for "breach of injunction" made on 8 October 1988 by the order of Lim Beng Choon J. Since I would be referring to the contents of the notice later and since the notice had been attacked as being defective for its failure on its face to specify the precise breaches of the injunction, the notice of motion, so far as relevant, is reproduced below:

Take notice that pursuant to the leave of this Honourable Court given on 22 April 1989, this Honourable Court will be moved ... for an order that Mahindapal Singh s/o Joginder Singh and Dhrampal Singh s/o Joginder Singh being partners of Syarikat Pal Bersaudara be committed to prison for their contempt of Court in that the said Mahindapal Singh s/o Joginder Singh and Dhrampal Singh s/o Joginder Singh personally being in breach of injunction made by the order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Lim Beng Choon dated 8 October 1988 whereunder the defendants abovenamed were ordered to:

and each of them do within seven (7) days of the service of this order upon them make and serve on the plaintiffs' solicitor an affidavit disclosing the full value of their assets whether within or without the jurisdiction of this Court, identifying with full particularity the nature of all such assets and their whereabouts and whether the same be held in their own names or held jointly or held by nominees otherwise on their behalf or/on behalf of any of them and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing specifying:

(i) the identity of all other banks and other accounts in their sole names or jointly held or held by nominees or otherwise on their behalf and the sums standing to their credit in such accounts;

(ii) any rural property or their assets money or goods owned by them or any of them and the whereabouts of the same and the names and addresses of all persons who have or may have possession, custody or control of any such assets, money or goods at the date of the service of this order upon the grounds set forth in the copy statement (sic) served herewith used on the application for leave to issue this notice of motion.

The notice of motion also contains a statement that in support of the motion it was intended to read and use the affidavit of Moiz Tahir Ali (the managing partner of the plaintiffs).

It is not disputed that both the 1st and 2nd defendants were served with the notice of motion, a copy of the statement made pursuant to O. 52 r. 2 of the Rules of the High Court (RHC) and the affidavit of Moiz Tahir Ali.

Counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants argued that since the notice of motion itself did not specify the breaches of the injunction the Court should refuse to make an order of committal and he relies on Chanel Ltd. v. F.G.M. Cosmetics [1981] Fleet Street Reports 471. In that case Whitford J refused to make an order of committal as he held the notice of motion for committal before him to be bad because it had failed on its face to specify the precise breaches of the undertaking of which the plaintiffs complained and he also held that it was not sufficient that these breaches were made plain in the affidavits served in the case and in a previous action.

While there is no specific reference in that judgment as to whether the notice of motion was filed under r. 3 or 4 of O. 52 of the English Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) it seems clear that since the case was not heard in the Divisional Court it was filed under r. 4. There is no equivalent Malaysian rule and I will advert to this later in my judgment.

So far as r. 4 of O. 52 of the English RSC is concerned a more authoritative decision is the Court of Appeal case of Chiltern District Council v. Keane [1985] 2 All ER 188. There Sir John Donaldson MR at p. 119 highlighted the need for procedural rules to be strictly complied with where the liberty of the subject is involved:

I have said suffi