(delivering the judgment of the court): In this action the plaintiff appeals from an order of Dato Sir Denys Roberts made on 7 August 1987 dismissing the action on a preliminary point, taken by the defendant, that the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation.

The plaintiff's claim is a claim for damages for personal injuries suffered by him, in the course of his employment by the defendant, as a consequence of an accident which befell him on 20 April 1981.

Section 3 of the Limitation Act (Cap. 14) provides, so far as is material, as follows:

"… every suit instituted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor … if limitation has been set up as a defence, shall be dismissed."

The prescribed period of limitation for the type of claim with which we are concerned is three years from the date on which the injury is committed (see item 92 of the First Schedule to the Act) excluding the day on which the accident happened (see section 11). The limitation period therefore expired on 20 April 1984. This was a Friday, a day when the court was closed. The court reopened on Saturday, 21 April 1984. That day was accordingly the last day on which the suit could have been instituted without risk of dismissal under section 3 (see section 4).

The facts are these. The plaintiff's legal representative attended at the registry of the High Court on Wednesday, 18 April 1984. The office was opened. He tendered the writ by which the plaintiff's suit was to be instituted, together with a praecipe (which was duly and correctly stamped). The papers were in order. The proper fees had been paid. The limitation period had not expired. It remained for the registry to deal with the matter. The proper entries had to be made in the cause book and the writ had to be sealed. These were matters entirely within the control of the registry and entirely outside the control of the plaintiff. In fact, from the date on it, the writ appears to have been sealed on 23 April 1984. It is this point on which the defendant fastens; for that date is two days after the last day, 21 April 1984, on which, as we have said, this suit could have been instituted without fear of dismissal on the ground of limitation.

The question, as we see it, is: Was this suit "instituted" before 21 April 1984 or after that date? We have no doubt of the answer. It is that the suit was "instituted" before 21 April 1984, namely, on 18 April 1984, when the correct papers for the institution of the suit were lodged by the plaintiff with the registry and the proper fees were paid. It is true, as Mr. Howell for the defendant pointed out, that under the Brunei High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, the writ by which the action was commenced is to be deemed to have been issued when it was sealed. But does the fact that we cannot deem the writ to have been issued before 23 April 1984 compel us to hold that the suit was not "instituted" on 18 April 1984, so soon as the plaintiff had done all he could possibly do to institute it? In our judgment, it does not.

But it really does not matter. The plaintiff lodged the correct papers for the institution of the suit, and paid the proper fees, on 18 April 1984, and accordingly the writ should have been sealed on, or as of, that date. There is no express provision to that effect in the rules, but it is, in our judgment, a matter of necessary implication. As this case shows, the date on which a suit is instituted may be crucial to the rights of the parties. To have those rights depend on the whim of a court functionary cannot be right. Such a thing cannot be allowed as an admissible feature of a civilized system of jurisprudence. (We are glad to have been assured that the proper practice, of sealing the writ on or with the date on which the correct papers are lodged, is that now invariably followed.)

In the light of our conclusion that on the facts of the present case we are able to hold that the suit was instituted on 18 April 1984, it may strictly be u