JUDGMENT

Kang Hwee Gee J:

[1] This is an appeal by the judgment debtor against the decision of the Senior Assistant Registrar in dismissing the judgment debtor's application to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the following grounds:

i. The issue raised before the Senior Assistant Registrar is pertaining to r. 215 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969 and s. 133 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 .

Rule 215 reads as follows:

215. Officer of corporation, etc.

Where a corporation presents a petition or takes any other action under this Act, this officer of the corporation may act in his own name, stating that he is such officer duly authorised under seal; but a petition may be presented by the corporation, and signed by the officer on its behalf. Any person chosen by the corporation to act for it as agent, is an "officer" within section 133 , and if duly authorised under seal can act for the corporation.

Section 133 reads as follows:

133. Acts of corporations, firms and mentally disordered persons.

For all or any of the purposes of this Act:

(a) a corporation may act by any of its officers authorized in that behalf under the seal of the corporation;

(b) a firm may act by any of its members;

(c) a mentally disordered person or lunatic may act by his committee or curator bonis .

ii. The request to issue the bankruptcy notice by the judgment creditor was in breach of r. 215 and s. 133 . The request under Form 4 of the bankruptcy notice was made by the judgment creditor company itself and signed by the solicitor for the judgment creditor. The said request should have been made by the officer of the company and signed by him. In this case it is clear that the request was made by the judgment creditor company and signed by the solicitor. See UMW Industries (1985) Sdn Bhd v. Lim Chee Hian, [2005] 2 MLJ 239 per Mokhtar Sidin JCA at 183:

First of all, the above request was made by the appellant (the corporation) and not by any officer of the company. Though there was a signature above the name of the company, it is a signature of an unknown person. No evidence was given by the appellant as to whose signature appeared above the name of the appellant. There is no evidence to show that the signature is the signature of Mr Siew Weng Leong. If it is, then he would be acting outside his authority. As can be seen, the request was made on October 9, 1989 while Mr Siew Weng Leong got his authority only on September 21, 1990. Looking at the request, we are of the view that the request was made by the appellant as a company and not made by an authorized officer or by any officer because no name of the officer appeared anywhere in the request. This is in direct contravention of rule 215 of the Bankruptcy Rules .

The appellant contended that the solicitors could act on behalf of the appellant to make the request. The respondent conceded to this and indeed the law permits such a request being made by solicitors on behalf of a company which in this case is the appellant. But the respondent disputed that the request was made by the solicitors for the appellant. Looking at the request, it is clear to us that though the name of the solicitors appeared in the request, the request was not made by the solicitors. As we have stated earlier, the request was made by the appellant themselves and the name of the solicitors appeared only as a notification that they are the solicitors for the appellant. In our view, the request was not made by the solicitors.

iii. Now see the actual Form 4 itself in encl. 2. It is clear that the company itself requested for the issuance of the notice but it was signed by the solicitor.

[2] The appeal is opposed by the judgment creditor on the following grounds:

i. Form 4 allows the judgment creditor or the solicitor to sign Form 4 . A solicitor is an agent of a corporation. See Timbunan Alam Development Sdn Bhd v. Platicorp Holding (M) Sdn Bhd, [2000] 2 MLJ 636 per Rekhraj J at 473-474:

It is a trite law, that a corporation can only be represented in cour