Wan Yahya J:

The appellant was charged under s. 4(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It was alleged that in the capacity of agent of the Government of the Federation he accepted various sums as gratification in respect of his principal's affairs. The main evidence against him came from the complainant whom the learned President unhesitatingly held to be an accomplice. The learned President believed the complainant's evidence as a whole and in particular to the sums which were alleged to have been paid to the appellant, but wisely looked elsewhere for corroboration before accepting his evidence. He found the required corroboration from the wife (PW2) whom he held not to be an accomplice, as well as from another witness (PW6).

In this appeal the learned President's grounds of judgment were severely objected to on four main grounds. Firstly it was contended that the charge was erroneously framed, as the appellant, being a Penghulu attached to the State Land Office and discharging his duty in connection with lands, is in fact a servant or agent of the State rather than the Federal Government. Secondly it was argued that, as the complainant's evidence varied on some matters with those of his wife, the lower Court should have rejected his evidence. Then it was contended that as a wife she was an accomplice and that one accomplice cannot corroborate another and lastly it was argued that in any event the matters on which she was able to testify did not amount to corroboration.

I shall be dealing with the first point last. As regards the second ground of appeal, my attention had been drawn to various discrepancies between PW1's evidence itself as well as between him and his wife. This, by itself, according to Counsel for the appellant, is good enough reason for the learned President to reject the complainant's story. Discrepancies are no doubt present in this case, as they do ostensibly appear in most cases in evidence of witnesses for the prosecution as well as the defence. The transcripts of most evidence, when thoroughly tooth-combed by any able lawyer, never failed to yield some form of inconsistencies, discrepancies or contradictions but these do not necessarily render the witness's entire evidence incredible. It is only when a witness's evidence on material and obvious matters in the case is so irreconcilable, ambivalent or negational that his whole evidence is to be disregarded.

Forgetfulness and failure to recall exactly certain events, which did not seem to be important to the witness, do not necessarily shake his credibility or render other parts of his story unworthy of belief. Various persons are endowed with varying powers of cognition, attentiveness and perception, so that it is not uncommon for two witnesses to a common event to describe it in slightly differing versions. Thus the slight dissimilarity between the evidence of the complainant and his wife is explicable. It was further contended that the inconsistencies in the evidence of the complainant itself should make his story unreliable. It is true that he gave capricious accounts of certain facts but then those matters relate mostly to subsidiary issues. He was understandably vague on details on sequence of events relating to the payments but of the payments themselves and the amount paid on each occasion the witness's evidence was positive and categorical. I agree with the learned President's findings on this not only because he, having seen and heard the witness is in a better position than I am to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, but also because I accept that no witness of truth can account for the details of events which had transpired some 17 months previously with precision.

The next point raised was whether the complainant's wife, in her role firstly as a consort and secondly as a participant in the crime, is an accomplice. The mere fact that a witness happens to be the wife of an accomplice, does not ipso facto turn her into an accom